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Abstract
Quantum mechanics notoriously faces the measurement problem, the problem that if read thoroughly, it implies the
nonexistence of definite outcomes in measurement procedures. A plausible reaction to this and to related problems is to
regard a system’s quantum state |ψ〉 merely as an indication of our lack of knowledge about the system, i.e., to interpret
it epistemically. However, there are radically different ways to spell out such an epistemic view of the quantum state.
We here investigate new developments in the branch that introduces hidden variables λ in addition to the quantum state
|ψ〉 and has its roots in Einstein’s views. In particular, we confront purported achievements of the view in the light of
recent no-go results. It will be demonstrated that, despite the debatability of the premises of such results, they force the
hidden variable theorist to make ad hoc moves which undermine the very conceptual basis of his own approach.
Keywords: ontological models, PBR theorem, ψ-epistemc models, quantum mechanics
1. Introduction
Quantum mechanics (QM), construed broadly, is the
scientific theory with the greatest practical impact and
predictive success (cf. e.g. [1, p. 116] or [2, p. 893] for ex-
amples), and yet to date it is still faced with the infamous5
measurement problem (MP) – the problem that the uni-
tary time evolution allows for and preserves superposition
states and thus provides no dynamics that lead to definite
outcomes in measurement procedures – and with related
issues, all ultimately rooted in quantum superposition.10
Dirac [3, p. 7] and von Neumann [4, p. 217] historically
attempted to solve the MP by adding the projection pos-
tulate (PP) to the theory, which says that when observable
A is measured on system S in state |ψ(t)〉, the state of S
undergoes a sudden change |ψ〉 −→ Pˆa|ψ〉‖Pˆa|ψ〉‖ with probabil-15
ity | 〈a|ψ(t)〉 |2. Here Pˆa = |a〉〈a| is the projection operator
onto the subspace spanned by |a〉, and so upon conclusion
of this process, the sate of the system is the (normalized)
eigenstate |a〉 of A. In modern QM, this theme readily
generalizes to case of degeneracy or even to more general20
positive operator valued measures (POVMs) {Eˆm}m∈I (I
some indexing set, Eˆm = Mˆ
†
mMˆm) in virtue of Lu¨ders’ rule
ρˆ −→ MˆmρˆMˆ†m
Tr(MˆmρˆMˆ
†
m)
, where ρˆ =
∑
j λj |ψj〉〈ψj | is the sys-
tem’s density matrix. This generalized (non-projective)
kind of measurement smells like epistemic uncertainties25
being involved; neither the outcome nor the state of the
system are quantum mechanically precisely fixed. But the
mere existence of projective measurements, in concert with
the eigenvalue-eigenstate link, i.e. the assumption that an
observable A (or a dynamical quantity, if you will) has30
value a on a system S iff the state of S is given by an
eigenvector |a〉 of an operator Aˆ representing A implies
the need for a more concise argument.
The traditional Dirac-von Neumann approach has evi-
dently raised many questions as to what even constitutes35
a measurement, and has (among other things) spawned off
fanciful interpretations in which conscious observation has
a direct impact on physical reality (cf. [5]; [6]). Of course
today we have a whole range of alternative responses to
the MP such as the may worlds interpretation, Bohmian40
Mechanics, objective collapse theories,... and what have
you, all with their particular vices and virtues. There is,
however, one particular response that sticks out in its ‘nat-
uralness’, and it is certainly endorsed in some form or other
by “[t]he philosopher in the street, who has not suffered45
a course in quantum mechanics” (Bell’s phrase [7]) and,
we may add, by the physicist in the lab who has not con-
cerned himself with the foundations of QM. This response
is to deprive the quantum state of its ontological signifi-
cance, and to construe the theory not as a description of50
the behavior of physical systems, but rather as a repre-
sentation of the knowledge an actual or ideal observer or
agent can have about these. On such a view, the need for
an instantaneous reduction of the state vector upon cer-
tain kinds of ‘measurement-like’ interactions is removed55
at once, and the ‘collapse’ appearing in the PP comes out
just a sort of informational update for the experimenter
upon registration of a given result.
Interpretations of this general sort are typically called
epistemic or ψ-epistemic. However, one can spell out an60
epistemic interpretation in multiple different ways, with
strongly diverging underlying assumptions. Leifer for in-
stance maintains that
it is important to distinguish two kinds of ψ-
epistemic interpretation. The most popular65
type are those variously described as anti-realist,
instrumentalist, or positivist.[...] The second
type of ψ-epistemic interpretation are those that
are realist, in the sense that they do posit some
underlying ontology. They just deny that the70
wavefunction is part of that ontology. Instead,
the wavefunction is to be understood as repre-
senting our knowledge of the underlying reality,
in the same way that a probability distribution
on phase space represents our knowledge of the75
true phase space point occupied by a classical
particle.[8, p. 72]
We are here concerned with epistemic interpretations
of the second type in Leifer’s classification, the kind of in-
terpretation of quantum states which is realist in a decisive80
sense and arguably strives for as much preservation of com-
mon sense as possible. The decisive sense of realism here
is at least a metaphysical or external one, meaning that
“[t]he world is (largely) made up of objects that are mind-,
language-, and theory-independent.” [9, p. 8] According to85
such realism, there should be no doubt that every system
always has a unique, definite state, a unique way of how
it ‘actually is’, despite our ignorance of this ‘actual how’.
This should also—a slightly stronger assumption—at least
in principle enable us to give a description of that definite90
state. The ‘weirdness’ that QM is notoriously associated
with is just an expression of our inability to properly access
the true states of certain (typically microscopic) systems,
and hence it vanishes when properly construed in terms of
incomplete knowledge.95
2. Einstein’s Views and Hidden Variables
A central tenet underlying this type of epistemic inter-
pretation is that QM is in fact an incomplete theory that
will (hopefully) be replaced by a more complete and com-
prehensive one in the future. This assumption surfaced100
early on when the peculiar features of QM became ap-
parent, and its most prominent proponent was, of course,
Einstein. This is most vividly reflected in his 1939 corre-
spondence with Schro¨dinger, where he writes:
I am as convinced as ever that the wave rep-105
resentation of matter is an incomplete repre-
sentation of the state of affairs, no matter how
practically useful it has proved itself to be. The
prettiest way to show this is by your example
with the cat (radioactive decay with an explo-110
sion coupled to it.) At a fixed time parts of the
ψ-function correspond to the cat being alive
and other parts to the cat being pulverized.
If one attempts to interpret the ψ-function as a
complete description of a state, independent of115
whether or not it is observed, then this means
that at the time in question the cat is neither
alive nor pulverized. But one or the other sit-
uation would be realized by making an obser-
vation.120
If one rejects this interpretation then one must
assume that the ψ-function does not express
the real situation but rather that it expresses
the contents of our knowledge of the situation.
[10, p. 43]125
Due to Einstein’s brave advocacy of these views, we
here coin the kind of epistemic interpretation in ques-
tion Einsteinian. Due to Bohr’s immortal influence on
the other sort of epistemic interpretation (the first kind in
Leifer’s classification), we will call it Bohrian, in contrast.130
Ironically, young Heisenberg also spoke merely of a “de-
struction of the knowledge of a particle’s momentum by an
apparatus determining its position” [11, p. 21; my empha-
sis – FB], and while he himself went on to develop onto-
logically more charged philosophical views of the quantum135
state, the Einsteinian view has it that this is all there is
to QM’s weirdnesses.
But how does one spell out such an Einsteinian epis-
temic view in detail? Einstein’s writings are often asso-
ciated with an ensemble interpretation of quantum states140
because of his continuing appeal to statistical ensembles,
as witnessed, e.g., in his reply to criticisms in Schlipp’s
volume on his life and work [cf. 12, p. 668], or in his 1936
Physics and Reality, where he writes: “The ψ-function
does not in any way describe a condition which could be145
that of a single system; it relates rather to many systems,
to ‘an ensemble of systems’ in the sense of statistical me-
chanics.” [13, p. 375]
While there remains some controversy over what Ein-
stein’s use of the word ‘ensemble’ actually entailed (cf.150
[14]; [15, p. 239 ff.]), a more explicit view of this kind was
later defended and extended by Ballentine, who describes
it in the following terms:
For example, the system may be a single elec-
tron. Then the ensemble will be the concep-155
tual (infinite) set of all single electrons which
have been subjected to some state preparation
technique (to be specified for each state), gen-
erally by interaction with a suitable appara-
tus. Thus a momentum eigenstate (plane wave160
in configuration space) represents the ensem-
ble whose members are single electrons each
having the same momentum, but distributed
uniformly over all positions. [16, p. 361]
The “state preparation technique” must in fact rather165
be viewed as an equivalence class thereof [cf. 17, p. 5],
since it is possible to use either a calcite crystal or a grid
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polarizer, say, to prepare a photon in a certain polarization
state.
It may not be immediately obvious why this view of170
the quantum state should count as ‘epistemic’, but it is
obvious from the above quote that at least Einstein was
aiming for an epistemic interpretation. Thus, he must have
had in mind an ideal or conceptual ensemble, as suggested
in Ballentine’s quote, construed as a cognitive tool for de-175
termining probabilities of experimental outcomes. This is
also the viewpoint of Harrigan and Spekkens [18, p. 150]
who think that “the ensembles Einstein mentions are sim-
ply a manner of grounding talk about the probabilities
that characterize an observer’s knowledge[...]” and sim-180
ilarly of Bartlett et al. [19, p. 4] who believe that “the
thesis that quantum states describe the statistical proper-
ties of a virtual ensemble of systems [...] is equivalent to
saying that it describes one’s limited information about a
single system drawn from the ensemble.”185
But what exactly are these ensembles comprised of?
They cannot be comprised of conceptual electrons (say) in
the sense of QM, because all QM assigns is the state vec-
tor which does not—and cannot—attribute definite values
for all observables at all times. So the conceptual ensem-190
bles must be comprised of something else, something not
exhaustively described by QM, but only by some set of
additional hidden variables.
Epistemic hidden variable approaches of course have a
long history in QM as well, and they are the most explicit195
version of the general contention that QM is incomplete
and that there are additional features in nature, more in
line with the concepts of classical physics and everyday
life thinking (cf. also [20, p. xvii ff.]). The assumption
of hidden variables is also clearly presupposed by ensem-200
ble approaches such as Ballentine’s, as is evident from
Whitaker’s analysis of them:
[I]f the wave-function of a free particle is an
eigenfunction of momentum, all members of
the ensemble will have the corresponding value205
of momentum, but in addition each has a pre-
cise value of position, though these values will
all be different. The values of position must be
called hidden variables, because they are not
related to the wave-function. [15, p. 210-211]210
In fact, all meaningful ensemble interpretations of QM
have to assume hidden variables (as has also been cogently
pointed out by Home and Whitaker [21, p. 263 ff.] and
d’Espagnat [22, p. 297 ff.]). But there is also the rather
trivial sense in which the term ‘ensemble’ plays a role in215
QM proper: since QM is concerned with probabilistic pre-
dictions, the state function must always also be allowed
to refer to an entire ensemble of equally prepared systems
[cf. 20, p. 6]. If QM is considered to be complete however,
then ψ should be taken to represent, at the same time, the220
state of an individual system, which is decidedly not the
case with probability distributions (or densities) used in
classical statistical mechanics.
The traditional ensemble interpretations are conceptu-
ally revisionary in this sense, in enforcing a break with225
the assumptions underlying orhtodox QM. But they are
formally conservative: QM as it is may serve as a formal
tool for devising statistical predictions; the possibility of a
more complete physical theory endorsing hidden variables
in a formally explicit sense is merely left open or hoped230
for.
There are, however, well known reasons why such for-
mally conservative epistemic interpretations never really
took off. Schro¨dinger [23, p. 156],1 for instance, started
developing counter-examples early on. One of his exam-235
ples was a harmonic oscillator with a given fixed value of
total energy ((n+ 12 )~ω for some fixed n, say). In the cor-
responding quantum state of the system, an eigenstate of
energy, there would be a large uncertainty as to the os-
cillators position x. But according to an ensemble view,240
kinetic and potential energy, depending on velocity and
position respectively, should be well defined at all times
for each individual member of the ensemble (or rather:
the physical objects referred to), whence there should be
a clear cut-off value for the position. To see this, con-245
sider that the potential energy increases with position x
in the oscillator potential, and kinetic energy (increasing
with velocity) cannot be negative (i.e., the oscillator does
not ‘less than not move’), so that the limit (n + 12 )~ω in
total energy implies a limit for possible positions. But QM250
of course predicts non-vanishing probabilities for positions
beyond that limit.
Similar worries are raised by quantum tunneling. In
α-decay, an α-particle has to tunnel through the Coulomb
barrier of the nucleus in order to be emitted. This escape255
is impossible in a classical physical scenario, since the par-
ticle would have to have greater potential than total en-
ergy at some point, which again implies negative kinetic
energies [cf. 15, pp. 214-215].
And finally, arguments that appeal to quantum inter-260
ference are typically invoked, since a simple statistical par-
ticle interpretation does not predict the observed interfer-
ence patterns in double slit experiments and the like. Only
the incorporation of an active part of the diaphragm (and
possible detectors behind both slits) may raise hopes for a265
suitable statistical analysis in terms of ensembles. Nothing
of this sort is present in the formally conservative ensemble
interpretations.
In summary, what these and many further examples
show is “how far away from the basic [...] ensemble one270
has to go – [...] as Bohr would have stressed, one must
include the measuring device as an active participator in
the measurement, not just a recorder of a fixed value.” [15,
p. 217] And the failure to do so may be seen as the major
crux of the historical ensemble approaches.275
1Cf. also [15, p. 214] for a more detailed analysis of Schro¨dinger’s
examples.
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3. Formal Revisions and Epistemic Models
Modern epistemic approaches in fact do use a revised
formal inventory, including the possibility for an active
part of the measuring device in producing the outcome
statistics. From this, they can prima facie successfully280
reproduce many predictions peculiar to QM from merely
epistemic restrictions – including examples of the infamous
quantum interference phenomena.
A particularly influential epistemic view of quantum
states in the more recent debate, developed originally by285
Spekkens [24] and extended in joint work with N. Harrigan
[18], and very much like (if not an instance of) the formal-
ism used by Bell [25], is that of the so called ontological
models (OMs).
3.1. The Ontological Models-Approach: General Outline290
To define what an OM is, Harrigan and Spekkens pre-
suppose an operationalistic understanding of QM, which in
their words means that “the primitives of description are
simply preparation and measurement procedures – lists of
instructions of what to do in the lab” [18, p. 128], and they295
contend that the goal of this operational formulation is
just to determine outcome probabilities for measurement
procedures. In contrast, the primitives of description in
an OM for this operational theory are the properties of
microscopic systems (ibid.).300
To match this operational understanding with the quan-
tum formalism, they associate a preparation procedure P
with a density operator ρˆ and a measurement M with a
POVM {Eˆj}j∈J . Unfortunately though, the association
of preparation procedure and quantum state is not clari-305
fied beyond this point: Does the quantum state represent
the preparation procedure itself? An equivalence class
thereof? That which results from it? A virtual ensem-
ble in the sense of section 2? Maybe we can make sense of
the association as follows: The quantum state ρˆ of a given310
system is the state of the system according to its prepara-
tion, whence we may read the word ‘state’ in a decidedly
non-ontological fashion: it does not represent how the sys-
tem actually is, but rather what can be said about it, in
virtue of what was done to it. ρˆ may of course be a pure315
state and correspond to an eigenstate of some operator,
whence the eigenvalue-eigenstate link is clearly severed in
this approach.
Outcomes in projective measurements, however, can
be identified with quantum states as well, whence quan-320
tum states should also be allowed to represent ‘states ac-
cording to measurement’. Notably, this reading fits well
with the general operationalism about QM, since the mea-
surement is also an operation performed on the system
and generally not so much different from the preparation325
procedure (think of a Stern-Gerlach measurement, where
both, preparation and measurement involve magnets and
screens). Indeed, we thus preserve half of the eigenvalue-
eigenstate link, i.e. that when an observable A is measured
to have value a on S, the state of S is given by |a〉, though330
only in the operational reading of ‘state’.
In accord with our analysis, we will, in what follows,
occasionally call ρˆ (or ψ) the P/M-state of a system. Given
this understanding of quantum states, Born’s rule provides
a probability PrρˆM (k) = Tr(Eˆkρˆ) of obtaining value k in a335
measurement procedure of type M given preparation pro-
cedure resulting in ρˆ, i.e. with the meanings of the indices
of the probability function loosened.
To define the notion of an OM, Harrigan and Spekkens
now introduce further formal inventory. The first ingredi-340
ent is a state space Λ with elements λ, termed ontic states.
These ontic states are supposed to represent a “complete
specification of the properties of a system[...].” [18, p. 128]
Talk of ‘ontic’ states, however, seems somewhat clumsy,
whence we will prefer to speak of true states instead, i.e.345
states which are true of the systems under consideration,
in a correspondence theoretic understanding of truth. This
is what the OM approach (obviously) aims for.
In addition to the space of true states λ, two proba-
bility densities are defined. The first one is termed epis-350
temic state, and is intended to reflect the knowledge a
possible observer might have about the λ ∈ Λ. Hence it
corresponds to a conditional probability p(λ|ρˆ) or pρˆ(λ)
of obtaining a certain true state λ, conditional on having
prepared P-state ρˆ. The second one, denoted by p(k|λ,M)355
or ξkM (λ), is called an indicator- or response function, and
it is supposed to reflect uncertainties in a given measure-
ment M leading to outcome k, conditional on the fact that
state λ obtains on a system.
To formally connect the probabilities occurring in the
OM approach to the quantum probabilities, Harrigan and
Spekkens [18, p. 128] now require that an OM must respect
the constraint∫
dλ ξkM (λ)pρˆ(λ) = Tr(Eˆkρˆ), ∀ρˆ,M (1)
to be a model of QM. That is: adding up (integrating)360
all the probabilities of obtaining a given outcome k, given
a certain measurement M and true state λ, weighted by
the probability that the state λ even occurs after having
prepared ρˆ, must reproduce the quantum probabilities.2
This fully defines what an ontological model is, the state365
space Λ, the epistemic state and the response function, and
the connection to QM given by formula (1). Hence ‘on-
tological model’ should be read here rather as a technical
term, since not much ontology is actually conveyed. The
OM approach sketches a road to modifications of QM’s370
formalism which allow for specification of an ontology in
which the quantum state does not figure, or at least not
fundamentally. It does not yet provide such an ontology.
Ipso facto, we are here dealing with an explicit hid-
den variables-approach, the true states λ being the hidden375
2For the mathematically inclined, measure theoretic generaliza-
tions can be found in [8, p. 82].
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variables. Generally λ need not be interpreted as a hidden
variable though, since it can be interpreted as the quantum
state ψ itself—the OM-approach is formally neutral on
this point. In fact, Harrigan and Spekkens [18, p. 129 ff.]
draw a multifold distinction between classes of OMs (cf.380
figure 1), with a dichotomy of ψ-onitc and ψ-epistemic
models. Intuitively this means that the quantum state can
either be construed as something that actually pertains to
real, mind-independent systems, or instead something we
ascribe to those systems only in virtue of our lack of knowl-385
edge about their true states. Within the first category they
again distinguish ψ-supplemented from ψ-complete mod-
els, where the former category simply consists of OMs in
which the quantum state is something that pertains to
reality, but still not all there is. Intuitively, Bohmian Me-390
chanics is an example of such a ‘model’, though it is not
clear that it formally fits the approach [cf. 26]. The notion
of ψ-complete models should now be self-explaining. For
obvious reasons, ψ-epistemic and ψ-supplemented models
are conjointly termed ψ-incomplete.395
To get a hold on the more precise definitions of the
different subclasses of models, it is sufficient to look into
the explicit3 definitions Harrigan and Spekkens provide for
ψ-onticity and ψ-completeness, as the other concepts can
be stated in terms of negations of these.400
Definition (ψ-completeness). An ontological model is ψ-
complete if the space of true states Λ is isomorphic to the
projective Hilbert space P(H) (the space of rays of Hilbert
space) and if every preparation procedure Pψ associated
in quantum theory with a given ray ψ is associated in the405
OM with a Dirac delta function centered at the true state
λψ that is the value of ψ in the isomorphism, pψ(λ) =
δ(λ− λψ).4
Put frankly, this definition tells us that an OM is ψ-
complete in case it reproduces QM tout court. The true410
states in Λ are bijectively mapped onto rays in Hilbert
space, and the probability of a true state obtaining, given
a preparation procedure associated with a ray inH, is such
that it is 1 for the true state that is the value of the ray in
the isomorphism, and zero for all other true states. The415
quantum statistics is reproduced in a trivial fashion.
As we saw, the notion of ψ-onticity is supposed to allow
for supplementation of ψ by elements of the model which
do not simply mirror elements of QM, whence a ψ-ontic
model is defined as follows.420
Definition (ψ-onticity). An ontological model is ψ-ontic
if for any pair of preparation procedures, Pψ and Pφ, as-
3We take it here that the ‘if’s occurring in the definitions made
by Harrigan and Spekkens are shortened iff s, as is a standard con-
vention in some branches of mathematics.
4Cf. [18, p. 131]. We have slightly altered the wording in the
definition, as Harrigan and Spekkens call λψ and ψ isomorphic, but
it is meaningless to talk of elements of spaces as ‘isomorphic’. The
appeal to projective space Hilbert space here is due to the invariance
of quantum states under multiplication by a global phase.
ψ-epistemic ψ-ontic
ψ-supplemented ψ-completeψ-incomplete
ontological
models
Figure 1: Classification of OMs according to the status of the
quantum state.
sociated with distinct quantum states ψ and φ, we have
pψ(λ)pφ(λ) = 0 for all λ.
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In other words, the supports of two epistemic states425
that are conditional on two different procedures for prepar-
ing distinct quantum states should not overlap (on sets of
non-zero measure). Now ψ-ontic models which do not sat-
isfy the first definition are called ψ-supplemented, non-ψ-
ontic models are called ψ-epistemic. The decisive criterion430
for a model to be ψ-epistemic is hence that there be an
overlap in (the supports of) the epistemic states associated
with distinct quantum states. The intuition being that, if
it may happen that λ is really the case in two instances,
and we have prepared for ψ in the one and for φ in the435
other, then ψ and φ themselves do not reflect something
pertaining to the system. Given that the probability dis-
tributions pρˆ(λ) were supposed to represent “what can be
known and inferred by observers” [18, p. 129], this can be
translated more crisply into the statement that one can-440
not know/infer for sure that a given λ is not sometimes
the case when one prepares for ψ, and sometimes when
one prepares for φ.
Note that it is also natural to assume that such an over-
lap of epistemic states is only required for non-orthogonal445
states in a ψ-epistemic model, since two orthogonal states
|φ〉 , |ψ〉, may be construed as indicative of mutually exclu-
sive preparation procedures that could arguably result in
mutually exclusive sets of true states. This assumption is
explicitly made, e.g., in [27] and [28]. The negation of ψ-450
onticity merely implies the existence of two such distinct
(non-orthogonal) states that have distributions associated
to them with overlapping supports. This is a compara-
tively weak requirement, and refinements in terms of dis-
tance measures between the epistemic states have been455
proposed (see e.g. [29, p. 477]; [30, p. 2]).
Again, we find justification for terming this kind of
epistemic interpretation ‘Einstieinian’, since the idea of
demonstrating the incompleteness of QM in virtue of the
existence of two ψ functions that correspond to the same460
5Cf. [18, idib].
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real physical state of an object at the same time was also
explicitly advocated by Einstein: “[...] coo¨rdination of sev-
eral ψ functions with the same physical condition of [some]
system [...] shows [...] that the function cannot be inter-
preted as a (complete) description of a physical condition465
of a unit system.” [13, p. 376]
3.2. The Philosophical Issues at Stake
The search for ‘completeness’ may raise some first wor-
ries as regard the definitions at hand. Recall that λ was
supposed to correspond to a “complete specification of the470
properties of a system[...].” But on a broad reading of
‘property’ this seems rather impossible. For suppose that
we have prepared for ψ in the one case and φ in the other,
and that in both cases λ is supposed to occur. Then we can
say that there is a (complex) relational property of being-475
in-a-Pψ-situation in the first case, and a relational prop-
erty of being-in-a-Pφ-situation in the second, and hence, λ
cannot strictly specify all properties.
Bell, whose work has certainly served as a paradigm
for the OM approach (as noted above), more cautiously480
talked about a “more complete specification”, for which it
is “a matter of indifference [...] whether λ denotes a single
variable or a set, or even a set of functions, and whether
the variables are discrete or continuous.” [25, p. 15; my
emphasis – FB] Clearly Harrigan and Spekkens must have485
in mind a particular set of physical properties; kinemati-
cal quantities similar to those arising from the phase space
formalism in classical mechanics, i.e. all (and only) those
properties that can be defined in terms of (generalized)
positions and momenta. Ruetsche [31, p. 31] in fact makes490
a point in our favor, in identifying generalized coordinates
and momenta as paradigmatic examples of magnitudes she
calls “fundamental in the physicist’s sense,” meaning that
it is usually assumed that the value of every other mag-
nitude pertaining to a system can be determined by as-495
signing values to these on the system. The ‘complete-
ness’ sought for by Harrigan and Spekkens must consist
in seeking such fundamental-in-the-physicist’s-sense quan-
tities. Quantum mechanically the closest analogy is the
complete set of comeasurable observables. But since these500
of necessity only include a subset of all conceivable ob-
servables, the contention (again) is that there must be
other, hitherto undiscovered magnitudes beyond QM’s ob-
servables, and more in line with the classical description.
But one should ask what actually singles out such a505
set of properties, beyond their usefulness for the applica-
bility of a given theory. How can we get hold of a preferred
set of ‘natural’ physical properties which ‘carve nature at
its joints’, as it were, and suffice to completely describe a
system in an ontologically privileged way? As regards use-510
fulness, QM proper arguably has quite an edge in the light
of all its predictive and technological successes—despite its
lack of definite descriptions similar to the classical phase
space formalism. So seeking completeness in more than a
theory-internal sense first of all require a sensible criterion515
for naturalness the of properties.
Besides the completeness-issues, a second point to won-
der is what concept(s) of probability are involved here,
a point which Harrigan and Spekkens refrain from elu-
cidating, as they “do not feel that the distinction [be-520
tween different concepts of probability – FB] is significant
in this context [...].” [18, p. 150] This distinction may
not be as ‘insignificant’ as they believe though, since, fa-
mously, there is a whole host of radically differing views
of probability, and opting for one particular view usu-525
ally has rather deep ontological and epistemological im-
plications. Possibly the broadest dichotomy one can draw
among probability-concepts is that between epistemic and
objective probability [cf. e.g. 32, p. 2]. For the epistemic
state, classification is pretty clear on this coarse level, but530
as regards the response function, matters are more subtle.
Harrigan and Spekkens here have it that “the model may
be such that the ontic state λ determines only the prob-
ability p(k|λ,M) of different outcomes k for the measure-
ment M .” [18, p. 128; my emphasis – FB] And this smells535
like the response function involving objective probability.
But in fact they also claim that “p(λ|P ) and p(k|λ,M)
specify what can be known and inferred by observers” [18,
p. 129; my emphasis – FB], which prima facie conflicts the
above. But remember that their claim merely was that an540
OM leaves it open whether (“may be such that”) λ deter-
mines only outcome probabilities for values k in measure-
ment M . And if there is indeed a random response of the
measurement device to the true states fed in, then it is,
of course, also the case that only a probability for a given545
outcome can be known or inferred by an observer.
We can take it though that the latter quote reflects
their own attitude towards both probability distributions,
i.e. that they envision (or at least hope for) an interpre-
tation of the response function according to which ran-550
domized responses “could occur because of our failure to
take into account the precise ontological configurations of
either [preparation or measurement]” [33, p. 4], or simply
reflect an “unknown disturbance” [34, p. 10; my empha-
sis – FB] of the system caused by the measurement—much555
like Heisenberg’s elimination of knowledge due to the mea-
surement process.
However, taking both probabilities to be epistemic in
this sense could, firstly, be fleshed out to yield a kind of mi-
crodeterminism, meaning that on a sufficiently fine-grained560
scale of observation (accessible only to Laplacian demons,
as it were), no probabilities would be needed. This would
take the debate to a whole other level though, since cur-
rently the central question is one of microdefiniteness, not
determinism. And secondly, we saw that a failure to take565
the role of the measurement device into account was the
main reason for failure of the historical (ensemble) ap-
proaches, so regarding the response function as merely re-
flecting epistemic uncertainties may not be good advice
after all, or at least raises further concerns.570
Leifer [8, p. 70], moreover, notes that “calling a proba-
bility density ‘epistemic’ [...] presupposes a broadly Bayesian
interpretation of probability theory in which probabili-
6
ties represent an agent’s knowledge, information, or be-
liefs.” But ‘broadly Bayesian’ is still too broad in this con-575
text, since there is also the quantum Bayesian approach,
which explicitly endorses subjective Bayesianism and re-
frains from entertaining (formally explicit) hidden vari-
ables. Consider Wil- liamson’s [35, p. iii] characteriza-
tion of the distinction between subjective and objective580
Bayesianism: “Subjective Bayesians hold that it is largely
(though not entirely) up to the agent as to which degrees
of belief to adopt. Objective Bayesians, on the other hand,
maintain that appropriate degrees of belief are largely (though
not entirely) determined by the agent’s evidence.” More-585
over, Williamson characterizes objective Bayesianism as a
normative theory, i.e., a theory which claims that “[t]he
strengths of an agent’s beliefs should behave like probabil-
ities[...].” [35, p. 1; my emphasis – FB]
Prima facie the OM approach is compatible equally590
with (some version of) objective Bayesianism as well as
what Williamson [35, p. 15] refers to as empirically based
subjective Bayesianism. All forms of Bayesianism, Wil-
liamson (ibid.) tells us, hold a Probability norm, meaning
that “one’s degrees of belief at a particular time must be595
probabilities if they are to be considered rational.” Empir-
ically based subjective Bayesians add a Calibration norm,
i.e. that “one’s degrees of belief [...] should also be cali-
brated with known frequencies.” (ibid.) Because the epis-
temic state is supposed to reflect what can be known and600
inferred by an observer (agent) – on the basis of evidence
about preparation methods, and the presumed range of
true states which can result from each preparation – we
can see that the attribution of probabilities must be on
the basis of known frequencies, and the Calibration norm605
supposedly holds in the OM approach. Below, when we in-
vestigate concrete models, we will give reasons to believe
that the OM proponents rather are objective Bayesians, in
that they assume an Equivocation norm as well, meaning
that “one’s degrees of belief at a particular time are ra-610
tional if and only if they are probabilities, calibrated with
physical probability and otherwise equivocate between the
basic possibilities.” [35, p. 16; my emphasis – FB]
As a third concern, we (re-)acknowledge that these
probability densities are probabilities of (or conditional615
on) true states λ obtaining, which we above identified as
the assumption that makes the whole approach decisively
(metaphysically) realist. In fact, all the issues at hand, the
status of the epistemic probabilities, the search for com-
pleteness, and the status of the quantum state, all boil620
down to questions of the precise kind of realism endorsed
by the ontological modlers.
It has been criticized though, in particular by Norsen
[36], that in certain applications in the context of QM
(the violations of Bell-type inequalities) the discussion is625
blurred by the use of the word ‘realism’, because “it is
almost never clear what exactly a given user means by the
term [...] and [...] none of [the] possibly-meant senses of
‘realism’ turn out to have the kind of relevance that the
users seem to think they have.” [36, pp. 311-312] Whether630
Norsen’s assessment is correct is open to debate. But we
concede that there is a crucial terminological problem that
we should try to fix.
First of all we note that the OM approach is not na¨ıvely
realist in the sense appealed to by Norsen [36, p. 316],635
namely in the sense that “whenever an experimental physi-
cist performs a ‘measurement’ of some property of some
physical system [...] the outcome of that measurement is
simply a passive revealing of some pre-existing intrinsic
property of the object.” (emphasis omitted) This, Norsen640
thinks, is the physics-appropriate generalization of “the
view that all features of a perceptual experience have their
origin in some identical corresponding feature of the per-
ceived object.” (p. 315)
Classical physics is typically taken to entertain exactly645
that sort of na¨ıve realism, as it seems to endorse that
measurements can at least in principle be as subtle and
non-invasive as desired (think again of Heisenberg’s “de-
struction of knowledge”, which he apparently considered
as a philosophical revelation). Similarly, the ensemble ap-650
proaches discussed in section 2 may be classified as na¨ıvely
realist, but the OM approach is not na¨ıvely realist in
Norsen’s sense, since both preparation and measurement
are infected with uncertainties, so that pre-existing intrin-
sic properties of systems are not just revealed passively6655
– at least as long as the response function is interpreted
objectively.
More illuminatingly, it appears that the approach en-
dorses scientific realism (i.e., that (i) mature and well con-
firmed theories are capable of being true, and (ii) the con-660
cepts of these very theories typically do refer to entities
in the external world, in all domains, including unobserv-
able microstates [cf. 37, p. xvii]), but only (or at least:
mostly) w.r.t. classical physical concepts and theories.
The fact that the OM approach aims for reducing quantum665
probabilities to classically interpretable ones, and quan-
tum states to definite states that provide a (more) com-
plete specification of reality should suffice as evidence for
this claim. Grossly speaking, we can hence classify the
OM-approach as selectively scientific realist. Peters [38,670
p. 377] describes selective scientific realism as the view
“that not all the propositions of an empirically success-
ful theory should be regarded as (approximately) true but
only those elements that are essential for its success”, but
he also notes that “[i]t is [...] not obvious how a term like675
‘essential’ is to be understood.” If we apply this reading
of ‘selective’ to the present case, we must take it that for
the proponents of the OM approach it is essential to the
success of a scientific theory that it provides a (somewhat
intuitable) picture of the world.680
We can see that rather deep philosophical issues are at
stake here, and the OM-approach provides a technically
6By judging thusly, we are in fact disagreeing with Norsen, who
thinks that this na¨ıve realism is the idea of a non-contextual hidden
variable model. But the disagreement may be based on the under-
standing of ‘context’.
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useful basis for their discussion in the context of QM. But
to assess whether the approach can ascertain the suitabil-
ity of objective Bayesianism and a selectively scientific re-685
alist attitude to the interpretation of QM, we must ask: (i)
Are there even any models which fit the definitions from
section 3.1, and (ii) to what extent can these reproduce
the empirical predictions of QM? Indeed, Harrigan and
Spekkens provide examples of models for each of their cat-690
egories, but we here turn to a model that Spekkens has
comprised in 2007 instead, and which has so far brought
forth the greatest apparent successes of the OM approach.
We will also grossly focus on this model to evaluate (ii).
3.3. Spekkens’ Toy Model695
What we here call a ‘toy model’ was originally devel-
oped by Spekkens [34] under the name “toy theory”, but
it can be fit into the OM approach, as shown in [8, p. 84]
and below. The toy model is only concerned with analoga
of qubit systems (i.e. systems with only two relevant states700
in QM), but can be expanded to include systems of mul-
tiple, coupled qubits. The analogues of qubits in the toy
model are called elementary systems (cf. [34, p. 3]). For
these elementary systems, Spekkens postulates four pos-
sible true states, simply denoted by {1, 2, 3, 4}. There is705
a foundational principle at the heart of this model, called
the kowledge balance principle:
Knowledge Balance Principle (KB). If one has max-
imal knowledge, then for every system, at every time, the
amount of knowledge one possesses about the [true – FB]710
state of the system at that time must equal the amount of
knowledge one lacks. [34, p. 3]
This, of course, immediately raises the question of how
to measure knowledge. To provide a measure, Spekkens
first defines what he calls canonical sets (cf. ibid.):715
Definition (Canonical set). A canonical set is a set of
yes-no questions that is sufficient to fully specify the true
state, and that has a minimal number of elements.
To understand this notion, consider that if one only
knows that the state of the system under investigation is720
in the set {1, 2, 3, 4} and one wants to find out in which of
the states it actually is, one could ask “Is it in state 1?”,
“Is it in state 2?”, and so forth. Or one could be smart
instead, and just ask, say, “Is the system’s state in the set
{1, 2}?”, and “Is the system’s state in the set {2, 3}?” Two725
nos will give assurance that it is in state 4, two yeses that
it is in 2, and one yes and one no that it is either in 1 or
3, depending on the order. Now the amount of knowledge
one has is defined within the toy model as “the maximum
number of questions for which the answer is known, in a730
variation over all canonical sets of questions.” (ibid.).
(KB) then dictates that one can always only know half
the answers in such a set, and this is somewhat reminiscent
of an epistemic reading of the uncertainty relations. Ap-
plied to physical systems such as spinful particles, we can735
understand it such that, “if we know the x-coordinate [of
spin – FB] with certainty then we cannot know anything
about the y-coordinate.” [8, p. 73] Put frankly, this means
that the epistemic states (for simple systems) within this
model must be distributions which assign probability 1/2740
to two states, and probability 0 to two others. That is, we
can always know that the state is in a subset like {1, 2}
but nothing more.
To connect these principles to QM, consider the follow-
ing six quantum states, which are only P/M-states of the
model:
|0〉 , |1〉 ,
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉),
|+i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ i |1〉), |−i〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − i |1〉),
with 〈0|1〉 = 0. Accordingly our epistemic states will be of
the form p(λ|x), λ ∈ {1, . . . 4}, x ∈ {0, 1,+,−,+i,−i}.745
Since we are only concerned with a discrete set of pos-
sible true states, the probability distributions can be rep-
resented by n-tuples. This also means that condition (1)
which connects the QM probabilities with the probabilities
in the OM must be changed to a sum:
Tr(Eˆkρˆ) =
∑
λ∈Λ
pρˆ(λ)ξ
k
M (λ) (2)
Spekkens introduces a convenient notation for the epis-
temic states, which we will also make use of in what fol-
lows. We hence make the following identifications:
p0 = (
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0, 0)! 1 ∨ 2, p1 = (0, 0, 12 , 12 )! 3 ∨ 4,
p+ = (
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0)! 1 ∨ 3, p− = (0, 12 , 0, 12 )! 2 ∨ 4,
p+i = (0,
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0)! 2 ∨ 3, p−i = ( 12 , 0, 0, 12 )! 1 ∨ 4,
Curvy arrows are used to denote correspondence between
different notations, and the disjunctions should be read
‘merely symbolic’ at this point (we will spend a few thoughts
on connections to logic below). We have, e.g., p0(1) =
p0(2) =
1
2 and p0(3) = p0(4) = 0.750
The response functions turn out deterministic here; for
instance,
Pr
|0〉
+/−(+) = | 〈+|0〉 |2 = 1/2
!
=
∑
λ∈Λ
p0(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ),
where ‘+/−’ refers to the measurement associated with
outcomes + and −. But this must mean that ξ++/−(λ) has
to give 1 for the first of the λs, and cannot also give 1 for
8
the second one. Equally,∑
λ∈Λ
p1(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|1〉 |2 = 1/2,
∑
λ∈Λ
p+(λ)ξ
+
+/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|+〉 |2 = 1,
∑
λ∈Λ
p−(λ)ξ++/−(λ)
!
= | 〈+|−〉 |2 = 0,
and so forth. All in all, we get ξ++/−(λ) = (1, 0, 1, 0), so
that the ξ for outcome + mirrors the p which is conditional
on +, but with 1s instead of 12 s. All the ξs can be worked
out to look this way.7
So actually ξ does not do any work here at all and755
could be omitted altogether. Models of this kind have
been coined maximally ψ-epistemic (cf. [28, p. 2]; [39,
p. 4]), and the toy model is such a maximally epistemic
model.
With this simple setup, Spekkens is prima facie able760
to reproduce a bunch of quantum phenomena. To this end
he assumes measurements to be “reproducible in the sense
that if repeated upon the same system, they yield the same
outcome.” [34, p. 9; emphasis in original] In other words:
they are like the projective measurements of QM. But as765
noted before, due to (KB) measurements cannot reveal the
true state λ, but can only change what one knows about
the system. To elaborate, first note that a state of total
ignorance, where one only knows λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, should
be described by an epistemic state p(λ) = 1/4,∀λ ∈ Λ, or770
1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4 [34, p. 4].8
In the light of this, we can substantiate our claim from
the previous section that the OM approach embraces objec-
tive rather than (empirically based) subjective Bayesian-
ism. In following Williamson’s analysis, we considered the775
crucial difference between the two to be the presence of
a Equivocation norm in the objective version, which is
absent in the subjective one. But in the absence of any
evidence about the true state of the system, the epsitemic
state must be of the equivocating kind 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4. And780
considering the model as a paradigm case of an OM, we can
concede that objective Bayesianism seems to be the most
appropriate characterization of the conception of proba-
bility involved.
Upon measurement 1∨2∨3∨4 will now be changed into785
a state where one knows one of the (symbolic) disjunctions
1 ∨ 2, 3 ∨ 4, 1 ∨ 3, . . . This is represented in the model as
the measurement ‘inducing a partition’, say {1, 2, 3, 4} M−→
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}}. This amounts to a probability update, rem-
7Note that it is not a contradiction that the entries in ξ sum up
to 2 instead of 1, as ξ expressed in this way is variable in λ, i.e., in
the true state on which it is conditional, not in the outcome. Only
the sum over all outcome probabilities, given fixed parameters (λ,M)
must sum to one.
8Since nothing at all is known in states like 1 ∨ 2 ∨ 3 ∨ 4, this
can also be construed to mirror completely mixed states that can be
decomposed into multiple convex combinations [cf. 34, p. 5].
iniscent, of course, of Bayesian condtionalization [cf. 35,790
p. 75 ff.]. Let us say that some experimenter has no
prior knowledge about the true state of a system, and
hence no preference in belief as to which state an inves-
tigated system is in. Then according to the objective
Bayesian tenor of the model, her epistemic state should795
be p = ( 14 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ,
1
4 ). Upon measuring the value + (say),
she will instantaneously think that the system must be in
one of the states 1 and 3, but she can still give no pref-
erence to any of the two. Thus her knowledge about the
system has to be represented as p+ = (
1
2 , 0,
1
2 , 0). This is800
the picture provided by the formal setup of the model of
what happens in a measurement, and it seems to explain
the presence of the projection postulate in orthodox QM.
It is important to note that (KB) is restricted to the
knowledge about a system at a given time. This is so be-805
cause given that one knows 1 ∨ 2, a measurement which
partitions {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} will lead to definite knowledge
of the state of the system prior to the measurement; in
case one measures 1 ∨ 3 the state must have been 1, in
case of 2 ∨ 4 it must have been 2. The fact that one still810
lacks complete knowledge about the system’s state after
the measurement is accounted for by an “unknown dis-
turbance” of the state, caused by the measurement [34,
p. 10].
The first achievement of this model now is that these815
measurements can be demonstrated to exhibit non-
commutativity, just as quantum measurements do. Con-
sider two measurements A and B inducing partitions
{{1, 2}, {3, 4}} and {{1, 3}, {2, 4}} respectively, and per-
formed on a system in state 1 ∨ 2. Performing the A-820
measurement first will keep the system in 1 ∨ 2 and the
B-measurement will then yield 1∨3 and 2∨4 with equal fre-
quencies. Performing them the other way around, the B-
measurement will first update the epistemic state to either
1∨ 3 or 2∨ 4; but now the A-measurement will yield 1∨ 2825
and 3∨ 4 with equal frequency. This should be compared,
say, to the non-commutativity of spin measurements along
orthogonal axes in a Stern-Gerlach experiment.
The next achievement is the (partial) reproduction of
quantum superposition. This is accomplished by defin-830
ing different rules for combining the epistemic states. For
instance, one could combine two states such as 1 ∨ 2 and
3∨4 by taking the true state of lowest index and combining
them into a new state, i.e. 1∨ 3. This may be symbolized
by writing (1 ∨ 2) +1 (3 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 3. Equally, we could835
take the true states of highest index to obtain 2∨4, which
may be written as (1∨ 2) +2 (3∨ 4) = 2∨ 4. Taking one of
higher and one of lower index from both epistemic states
respectively will yield two further possibilities (+3 and +4;
cf. [34, p. 6]). With these four combination rules, the in-840
terrelations of all six quantum sates considered above can
be mirrored, which is best illustrated in terms of Bloch
spheres (or Bloch sphere-like diagrams), as in figure 2.
There are, however, a few subtleties involved in this
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|0〉
|1〉
|+〉
|−〉
|−i〉 |+i〉
1 ∨ 2
3 ∨ 4
1 ∨ 3
2 ∨ 4
1 ∨ 4 2 ∨ 3
(a) (b)
Uˆ = 1√
2
(
1 i
i 1
)
P =
(
1 2 3 4
2 3 1 4
)
Figure 2: (a) is a regular Bloch sphere for the qubit states,
(b) is an analogous diagram for the epistemic states. Two of
these can be combined by operations +1, . . . , +4 to yield one of
the respective other states, just as two quantum states can be
superimposed to yield a third one. In (a), transformations are
represented by unitary operators (which can be mapped onto
rotations), in (b) permutations are used instead.
analogy which lead into a (first) kind of trouble. Combin-
ing, say, (2∨ 3) +4 (1∨ 4) = 2∨ 4 in the toy model should,
according to the Bloch sphere-image, be analogous to su-
perposing |+i〉 and |−i〉 to get |−〉 in QM, i.e. developing
|−〉 = 〈+i|−〉 |+i〉 + 〈−i|−〉 |−i〉 = 1+i2 |+i〉 + 1−i2 |−i〉.
A complication is now raised, however, by the fact that
combination rules +3 and +4 have a particular ordering
sensitivity, as e.g. (1 ∨ 4) +4 (2 ∨ 3) = 1 ∨ 3 6= (2 ∨ 3) +4
(1 ∨ 4). One can model this situation by a superposition
1√
2
(|+i〉 − i |−i〉) with relative phase, which is equal to
e−i
pi
4 |−〉, because
e−i
pi
4 = cos
(
−pi
4
)
+ i sin
(
−pi
4
)
=
= cos
(pi
4
)
− i sin
(pi
4
)
=
1√
2
(1− i),
so that
e−i
pi
4 |−〉 = 1√
2
(1− i) |−〉 = 1√
2
(|+i〉 − i |−i〉).
I.e., we obtain |−〉 up to a(n empirically meaningless global
overall) phase, but the superposition rule thus essentially
includes a relative phase of 3pi2 (since e
i 3pi2 = −i) between
the two states superposed. In fact, the four combination
rules above can all be understood in terms of quantum
superpositions with a relative phase, and Spekkens [34,
p. 7] makes the following identifications:
+1! +ei·0, +2! +eipi,
+3! +ei
pi
2 , +4! +ei
3pi
2 .
These identifications reveal the subtleties mentioned above845
and show that the analogy between combinations of epis-
temic states and quantum superpositions is not—and can-
not be made—perfect. In the given choice one obtains
(1 ∨ 3) +3 (2 ∨ 4) = 2 ∨ 3 and (1 ∨ 3) +4 (2 ∨ 4) = 1 ∨ 4,
but 1√
2
(|+〉+eipi2 |−〉) = eipi4 |−i〉 and 1√
2
(|+〉+ei 3pi2 |−〉) =850
e−i
pi
4 |+i〉, which, given the identifications between combi-
nation rules and epistemic- and quantum states, should be
exactly the other way around. Exchanging identifications
θ = pi
d1
d2
S
BS1 BS2
Figure 3: Mach-Zehnder interferometer with an optional phase.
in the latter case will always only shift the problem [cf. 34,
p. 7]. According to Spekkens (ibid.), “[t]his curious failure855
of the analogy shows that an elementary system in the toy
theory is not simply a constrained version of a qubit.”
So the toy model fails to correctly reproduce the QM
toolkit from epistemic restrictions in this instance, and is
bound to do so. But this need not be a strong objection860
yet, because it should not be required that any successful
alternative to QM must mirror the quantum formalism
isomorphically; a successful replacement of, or alternative
to QM should only be required to preserve QM’s successful
predictions. If we construe the model, however, as a first865
approach to reducing the exact rules of QM to incomplete
knowledge, then it must still appear as a drawback that
the model fails to do so.
Be that as it may, further interesting phenomena can
apparently be reproduced within the toy model by appeal870
to state transformations represented in the model as per-
mutations of true states in the epistemic state, or equiva-
lently, by resamplings of the epistemic state (cf. figure 2).
In the Bayesian paradigm this amounts to a change in an
observer’s knowledge. The point being that the true state875
of a system does not even have to change, even if the epis-
temic state of an observer does. One can of course find
out some new piece of information, regardless of whether
the system this information is about remains entirely un-
changed. Intuitively we can access the formal analogy to880
unitary transformations in the Bloch representation, as the
latter correspond to rotations (up to an overall phase) of
pointers inside the sphere, and permutations will also ap-
pear as rotations by angles of npi2 (n ∈ Z) in the toy sphere
(cf. figure 2 (b)).885
But what is striking about permutations as state trans-
formations is that they seem to make the reproduction of
interference examples possible. To elaborate, consider the
following setup based on a Mach-Zehnder interferometer
(figure 3), where one photon at a time enters the setup,890
emitted from a source (S) towards a 50/50 beam splitter
(BS1), so that there will be a 50/50 chance for each pho-
ton of passing through BS1 or being reflected at a right
angle.
Neglecting polarization etc., we can model this as a
simple spatial qubit of a ‘moving up state’ |↗〉 .=
(
1
0
)
and
a ‘moving down state’ |↘〉 .=
(
0
1
)
(‘
.
=’ implies a choice of
representation). Now take a photon prepared as |↗〉 by S.
10
BS1 will change the state into a superposition of moving
up and moving down, represented by
UˆH |↗〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉+ |↘〉) =: |ψ〉 , (3)
UˆH
.
= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
the Hadamard gate.895
Imagine now that behind each beam of photons ema-
nating from BS1 there are mirrors (the thick black lines
in figure 3), so that both trajectories run towards each
other again. We can represent the transformation effected
by the mirrors by the σˆx Pauli-matrix, which will only
exchange the flying up- and down-components of |ψ〉 and
hence essentially leave it untouched, as(
0 1
1 0
)
1√
2
(
1
1
)
=
1√
2
(
1
1
)
.
We can also insert a phase shifter in the lower branch, say,
but after the mirrors, so that it will only affect the flying-
up part of the spatial superposition state. If we choose
θ = pi as our phase, we will obtain a transformation which
can be represented by the matrix
Φˆ(θ)
.
=
(
eiθ 0
0 1
)
θ=pi
=
(−1 0
0 1
)
, (4)
(which is just (−1) · σˆz) so that we get
Φˆ(pi) |ψ〉 .=
(−1 0
0 1
)( 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
− 1√
2
1√
2
)
.
=
1√
2
(|↘〉 − |↗〉) =: |ψ′〉 . (5)
But in case we insert a second beam splitter (BS2 in the
figure) at the point where the two trajectories cross, |ψ′〉
will change as
UˆH |ψ′〉 .= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)(− 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
0
−1
)
.
= − |↘〉 . (6)
So our simple qubit model predicts that we will always
find a down moving photon in this setup, which has only
picked up an unobservable phase of pi (eipi = −1).
Computing the probabilities for detecting an up- or
downward traveling photon at the end of this setup gives,
of course, | − 〈↗|↘〉 |2 = 0 and | − 〈↘|↘〉 |2 = 1. The
relative phase between two kets is entirely responsible for
the precise resulting behavior at BS2;
9 without the phase
we would instead have
UˆH |ψ〉 .= 1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)( 1√
2
1√
2
)
=
(
1
0
)
.
= |↗〉 , (7)
9Note that we have assumed both arms of the interferometer to
be of equal length, so that none of the two states can pick up a phase
due to spatial delay.
i.e. only photons moving up at the end of the setup.
To check the predictions of this model one can use de-900
tectors (d1 and d2 in figure 3) which give off a perceivable
signal (a click if you will) upon incidence of a photon.
With the phase shifter in place this (ideally) means only
detections in d2, and without the phase shifter (ideally)
only in d1, and experiments of this kind have of course905
been successfully performed [40].10
Since the setup contains only one photon at a time, it
seems surprising that it should matter to a photon travel-
ing along the upper path whether there is a phase shifter
in the lower one. But still, an analogous example can be910
constructed in the toy model by appeal to permutations
instead of unitary matrices. The simplest type of permuta-
tion is a swap of two elements in an ordered sequence, and
we will describe all permutations occurring in the exam-
ple in terms of such swaps here. Thus, let (jk) represent915
the swap of elements j and k in some ordered n-tuple.
Then in the toy model we start out with 1 ∨ 2 ! p↗
as the epistemic state corresponding to the preparation of
|↗〉 (= |0〉). The first beam splitter is represented by a
permutation (23), which results in 1∨ 3 (i.e. 3 will now be920
assigned the probability previously assigned to 2, which
is 12 ). The mirrors can be represented by (13), yielding
3 ∨ 1 = 1 ∨ 3, so that not much happens here, just as in
the QM treatment. In case the phase shifter is in, this
can be modeled as a permutation corresponding to two925
successive swaps (12)(34) which then yield 2 ∨ 4. And
the second beam splitter will again correspond to (23), so
that the final state is 3 ∨ 4. But this distribution is the
one corresponding to the quantum sate |1〉 = |↘〉 so that
the quantum predictions are indeed preserved. Equally,930
if the phase shifter is not inserted, this means that the
permutation (12)(34) is left out, whence 1 ∨ 3 will just be
transformed into 1∨2 at the second beam splitter, and we
obtain the state that we started off with, again just as in
QM.935
Thus the toy model can indeed reproduce interference
examples with the aid of resamplings of probability distri-
butions. And resamplings can result in the toy-analogue
of superpositions just as unitary transformations can re-
sult in quantum superpositions. We have considered only940
a limited example with a certain fixed phase, but a mathe-
matical generalization of Spekkens’ work exists [41] which
can handle arbitrary phase arguments in terms of proba-
bility vectors and transformation matrices. This achieve-
ment has lead several authors to conclude that “a whole945
host of Mach-Zehnder interferometry experiments can be
10In fact, varying the phase somewhat more than just θ ∈ {0, pi},
one can appeal to probabilities of detection in either d1 or d2, where
Pr
ψθ
x (d1) = | 〈↗|ψθ〉 |2 = cos2( θ2 ) for |ψθ〉 := 12
(
(1 − eiθ) |↘〉 +
(1 + eiθ) |↗〉
)
, as results from the setup with a general phase shift.
One can equally use a difference in path length, as mentioned in
footnote 9, and this is what was done in [40], to confirm that the
number of counts would conform to the predicted cos2-regularity
(cf. p. 178).
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qualitatively reproduced by the theory[...].” [8, p. 79]11
“But hold on!”, you may interject, “How can a lack
of knowledge account for the fact that what I do in the
lower arm of the interferometer will influence all photons950
in the setup, even if they take the upper route?” And
as well you should. We have here rather ‘blindly’ applied
the formal tools of the toy model, which then appeared
to nicely mirror some features of QM. But that permu-
tations can be made to look like rotations on the Bloch955
sphere, and that these rotations in turn are homomorphic
to unitary operations is a long shot from accepting that
resamplings of a probability distribution (construed as a
formal representation of a change in knowledge) can ac-
count for what goes on in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.960
How is it that our knowledge should be affected by the
putting in of the phase shifter? The framework embraces
objective Bayesianism, a normative theory about degrees
of believe; and why should the norms set by the model (or
rather: by QM) be reasonable?965
For all we know, many of the true states of systems in
the setup—those representing something moving through
the upper route—should not be affected at all, whence,
a fortiori, neither should our knowledge of them. Build-
ing the example bottom-up, we would certainly not have970
guessed that putting in a phase shifter must result in in-
terference, in case only one photon enters the setup. It is
only our background knowledge of QM and the confirming
experiments that allows us to concoct the toy model in the
appropriate way, and it leaves us without any explanation975
as to why our knowledge should change in this way. To be
fair, we should here take into account that Spekkens aims
to “identify phenomena that are characteristic of states of
incomplete knowledge regardless of what this knowledge
is about.” [34, p. 2] A possible move at this point is thus980
to counter that we are informed by our experience with
Mach-Zehnder interferometers, and that we should, in ac-
cord with the Calibration norm, adapt our epistemic states
to the known frequencies in experiments with or without
phase shifter.985
Still, there is some tension with the general philosoph-
ical stance of the OM approach as we have identified it in
previous sections. A key motivation for the OM approach
(or the Einsteinian view in general) is a certain preserva-
tion of common sense, a certain kind of ‘classicality’, and990
hence a secure basis for thorough metaphysical realism. In
particular, the introduction of true states λ was identified
to ensure microdefiniteness, and as such it raises hopes
for finding a more complete physical theory that makes it
possible (in principle) to give an account of how the world995
is (beyond the QM description). Thus if the project is
to serve its principal goal, it should at least allow for an
ontology of the true states that provides an explanation of
the situation in question.
Hence: What do 1, 2, 3, 4 represent, and how are they1000
affected by the setup in such a way that the kind of prob-
11Cf. also [42, p. 3] or [43, p. 388].
ability update exemplified above is indicated? In fact,
Spekkens and others seem to feel this need for explanation
as well whence there is a kind of (ex post) explanation in
the literature (cf. [44]; [42]; [8]). But we will only be able1005
to suitably demonstrate how the ψ-epistemicist actually
steers his own approach into another kind of dilemma with
this after a discussion of certain no-go theorems below.
To round things off, we should now first look at com-
bined states of two (or more) simple systems in the model.1010
Loosely following [34, p. 11], we can represent the simul-
taneous occurence of two true states i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 4} on
two distinct systems a, b respectively by a (symbolic) con-
junction i(a) ∧ j(b). Of course having such an epistemic
state is prohibited by (KB) since it would correspond to1015
complete knowledge of the true states of both systems.
But combinations of epistemic states, i.e. states of the
form [j(a) ∨ k(a)] ∧ [`(b) ∨m(b)], with j, k, `,m ∈ Λ, and
j 6= k, ` 6= m, are possible. These mimic simple product
states of QM, such as |ψ(1)〉 |φ(2)〉 (the bracketed index1020
indicating the respective system to which the state per-
tains).
A second possibility are states of the form [j(a)∧k(b)]∨
[`(a)∧m(b)]∨ [n(a)∧ o(b)]∨ [p(a)∧ q(b)] with j 6= ` 6= n 6=
p, k 6= m 6= o 6= q. I.e.: it could be known, say, that both1025
systems are in the same state, but not in which state. Or
it could be known that both are in different states, related
by a certain specified permutation (transformation), but
not which is in which. States of this form are supposed to
mimic entangled states, and prima facie they do capture1030
the essence of such states quite well.
To see this, take two systems which have been prepared
in an entangled state, say |pi〉 = 1√
2
(|0, 0〉 + |1, 1〉). Then
this state implies that there is a probability of 1/2 for each
(sub)system to exhibit either of the two measurable val-1035
ues (0,1), but both systems are bound to exhibit the same
value if the same observable is measured on them. Now
consider a situation in which the two systems are sepa-
rated spatially and two agents, A and B or ‘Alice’ and
‘Bob’, as they are usually called, perform measurements1040
on them. Then at the very moment Alice measures ‘1’,
she will know that Bob will measure ‘1’ as well, in case he
measures the same observable. Phrased in terms of knowl-
edge this is not so much of a surprise, but if we would en-
dorse the orthodox interpretation instead, with its sudden1045
change in the system’s actual state due to the measure-
ment, then Alice would be capable of ‘steering’12 Bob’s
system into some definite state, by choosing a certain kind
of measurement to perform on her system—and suppos-
edly instantaneously so at arbitrarily large distances.1050
From the point of view of the toy model this surprising
consequence dissolves. Alice’s state prior to measurement
should be represented as [1(a)∧1(b)]∨ [2(a)∧2(b)]∨ [3(a)∧
3(b)]∨ [4(a)∧ 4(b)], since she knows that both systems are
12This is the much-used term introduced by Schro¨dinger [45,
p. 556].
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in the same state, even though she cannot know in which1055
one. Accordingly, the measurement must result in some-
thing like [1(a) ∨ 2(a)] ∧ [1(b) ∨ 2(b)], say. Treating the
connectives in these symbolic formulae as actual conjunc-
tions and disjunctions as in propositional logic for the mo-
ment, the latter statement straightforwardly follows from1060
[1(a) ∧ 1(b)] ∨ [2(a) ∧ 2(b)] by case distinction and adding
disjuncts. But the other, more important direction is not
straightforwardly valid, since [1(a) ∨ 2(a)] ∧ [1(b) ∨ 2(b)]
is also true if [1(a) ∧ 2(b)] holds, and taking into account
that states pertaining to the same system mutually exclude1065
each other,13 [1(a)∧ 1(b)]∨ [2(a)∧ 2(b)] would actually be
false. With the epistemic state as given above however
(the fourfold disjunction) and mutual state exclusion on
the same system, Alice can draw the appropriate conclu-
sion.1070
Let us say that Alice chooses to measure {{1, 3}, {2, 4}}
on her system and finds 1∨3. Then she will come to know
that both systems must be in either of those two true states
(1 or 3). If she decides to measure {{1, 2}, {3, 4}} instead
and finds 1 ∨ 2, then she comes to know that both sys-1075
tems must be in one of these states. So in fact performing
both measurements in a row and obtaining these respec-
tive results Alice can come to the conclusion that both
her and Bob’s system must have been in state 1 all along.
So she instantaneously obtains information about the dis-1080
tant system. But since the act of measurement effects
and unknown disturbance, the states of both systems may
now (after both measurements) be different; the state of
her system (a) could have changed to 2, in virtue of the
disturbance effected by the second measurement. And as-1085
suming Bob performs the same protocol, he need not even
obtain outcome 1∨2 in the second measurement, since his
system’s state could have been changed to 3 in the first
measurement and then 3 ∨ 4 would result in the second
case. All that Alice can come to know is hence that dur-1090
ing the first measurement both systems were in state 1;
and hence this setup cannot be used as a means of com-
munication. This is of course reminiscent of the so called
no-signaling theorems in QM [cf. e.g. 46, pp. 393-394].
The truly crucial thing to realize, however, is that even1095
if there is no real change in the true state of b due to Al-
ice’s measurement, it may still appear this way in case
one confuses the epistemic state with the true state of the
system. The suggestion here being that this confusion is
exactly what happens in orthodox QM. The example is1100
indeed suggestive; prima facie the ψ-epistemicist has a
major advantage here. But the example is also selective,
and we all know that the existence of Bell-type inequali-
ties raises doubts about this kind of an interpretation of
entanglement.1105
For completeness’ sake, it should not go unmentioned
that Bartlett et al. [19] have worked out a model similar
in spirit to Spekkens’ original toy model, which reproduces
13It would hence be more appropriate to use exclusive disjunction
∨˙ instead of ∨.
a bunch of phenomena in continuous-range systems.14 A
thorough discussion of this model exceeds the scope of this1110
paper, whence we only give a brief review. In short, the
authors show that putting an epistemic restriction (similar
to (KB)) on Liouville mechanics, the statistical version
of classical Hamiltonian mechanics, one obtains a theory
which is “operationally equivalent” (p. 2) with a subtheory1115
of QM, which they spell out to mean that
there is a one-to-one mapping between the prepa-
rations, measurements, and transformations that
are allowed in the first theory and those that
are allowed in the second and [that] the statis-1120
tics predicted for every possible experiment in
the first theory are precisely the same as those
predicted for the corresponding experiment in
the second theory. (p. 15)
Because the model is a restricted version of classical1125
statistical mechanics, the true states of systems in ques-
tion are points z = (q1, . . . , q3n, p1, . . . , p3n) in phase space
(for n mass points with 3 position and 3 momentum coor-
dinates qi, pj ; we set 6n ≡ N).
The epistemic restriction is twofold. First of all, Bartlett
et al. define the set
L+(Γ) :=
{
µ|µ : Γ→ R, µ ≥ 0,
∫
Γ
µ(z) dNz = 1
}
of (Liouville) probability densities on phase space Γ. Then
for any µ to be considered a valid distribution for their
model, it is required that (i) the covariance matrix γ(µ)
satisfies the ‘classical uncertainty principle’ γ(µ)+inΣ ≥ 0,
where n is a free parameter and
Σ :=

0 −1 0 0 . . .
1 0 0 0
0 0 0 −1
0 0 1 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
,
and that (ii) µ has maximum entropy
S(µ) = −
∫
Γ
µ(z) ln(µ(z)) dNz
over Γ among all phase space distributions with the same1130
covariance matrix [19, p. 5]. The covariance matrix of
a distribution that depends on multiple coordinates zi, zj
(in phase space, in this case) describes, in components γij ,
(twice) the covariance
〈(
zi − 〈zi〉
)(
zj − 〈zj〉
)〉
µ
, i.e. the
correlation of departures from the mean values 〈zi〉µ , 〈zj〉µ1135
according to µ [cf. 47, p. 361]. The bite of (i) is that it
parallels an actual formulation of the uncertainty relations,
14It is however not clear that the model fits into the OM approach
or whether it can be made to do so. This does not pose a problem
for us though, since we are concerned more generally with epistemic
approaches to QM.
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and thus ensures that in the restricted Liouville mechan-
ics, relations such as ∆px∆x ≥ n/2 hold (for adjustable n).
(ii) on the other hand “ensures that an agent should have1140
the maximum uncertainty about the physical state of the
system consistent with knowing the means and the covari-
ance matrix.” [19, p. 5] The valid distributions satisfying
(i) and (ii) are all of Gaussian form.
The theory which results is thus operationally equiv-1145
alent (in their sense) to what they call “Gaussian quan-
tum mechanics” (p. 2), the part of QM “including only
those preparations, measurements, and transformations
that have Gaussian Wigner representations [...].” (ibid.)
However, we shall argue below that even in this more elab-1150
orate model, some quantum phenomena—and arguably
the most important ones—cannot be reproduced.
4. The Impact of No-Go Results
The OM approach has been confronted with a bunch
of no-go results, the most influential one being that of1155
Matthew Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, and Terry Rudolph
(PBR), published in Nature in 2012. In a preprint-version
of their paper, the authors also proposed an error-tolerant
version of the experimental conditions described in the
proof, allowing for an actual test of the diverging pre-1160
dictions, which has indeed been successfully implemented
shortly after [48]. The theorem is supposed to demonstrate
that a ψ-epistemic interpretation of QM is not feasible, but
its proof is of course not free of assumptions that we need
to dedicate some careful attention to. The theorem is first1165
demonstrated for quantum states with overlap 〈φ|ψ〉 = 1√
2
and then generalized to states with arbitrary overlaps. We
shall restrict ourselves to a discussion of the former case
and only briefly sketch how the generalization is estab-
lished.1170
We shall see, however, that the impact of this partic-
ular theorem may not be as devastating to a ψ-epistemic
interpretation as its popularity suggests. Its main impact
rather is that it has spawned off a new level of the debate
and inspired a host of further no-go results. We will sub-1175
sequently confront a theorem by L. Hardy [42], which ap-
pears to have much greater implications for the successes
of the OM approach.
4.1. The PBR Theorem
To show the incompatibility of QM with ψ-epistemic1180
models, PBR consider two qubit systems which are sup-
posed to be prepared entirely independently of one an-
other, each in one of the two quantum states |0〉 and |+〉.
Note that these states are non-orthogonal, whence, in line
with the discussion above, they are plausible candidates1185
for P-states with overlapping associated probability distri-
butions, signifying ψ-epistemicity.
The first important thing to realize, however, is that
the assumption of independence translates into two dif-
ferent formal requirements in the two different formalisms
(QM proper and the OM approach), whose intertransla-
tion requires a bridging assumption. In QM, independence
can be represented by the use of product states; thus, if
|Ψ〉 denotes the total P-state of the two systems, we can
translate the assumption of preparation independence into
|Ψ〉 ∈ {|0〉 |0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ1〉
, |0〉 |+〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ2〉
, |+〉 |0〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ3〉
, |+〉 |+〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:|Ψ4〉
} =: P (Prod. 1)
(with i, j ∈ {0,+}, P for ‘preparation’). Now in the OM-
approach two true states λ1 and λ2 need to be specified,
since two systems are concerned. The next non-trivial as-
sumption (the bridging principle) is that the state space
is separable in an appropriate manner, i.e.:
ΛΨ = Λ1 × Λ2, (Sep.)
with Λ1 and Λ2 the state spaces of the two systems re-
spectively. This separability assumption amounts to as-
suming that, “when modeling independent local prepara-
tions, there are no additional properties of the joint system
that are not derived from the properties of the individ-
ual systems.” [8, p. 100] It is hence basically the onto-
logical assumption which justifies the next step. Namely,
given (Sep.), the independence-assumption can be trans-
lated into a classical probabilistic language, suitable for
the OM-approach, as
pj(λ1, λ2) = pk(λ1)p`(λ2), j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k, ` ∈ {0,+}
(Prod. 2)
[cf. 29, p. 477], where pj(λ1, λ2) := p(λ1, λ2|Ψj) and
pk(λ) := p(λ|ψk) (j ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, k ∈ {0,+}). The two
conditions (Prod. 1) and (Prod. 2) are neither logically
equivalent, nor does (Prod. 1) straightforwardly imply
(Prod. 2). But arguably (Prod. 1) conceptually implies
(Sep.), and (Sep.) conceptually implies (Prod. 2): If we
can prepare two systems in (sufficient) isolation from one
another, we use a tensor product in QM to represent the
(P-)state of a composite system. But if we use such a prod-
uct state, we assume both component systems to be (suf-
ficiently) independent of one another. And given that we
hence assume their respective (true) states to also be inde-
pendent of one another, i.e., given (Sep.) we would model
this very situation by a mere product-distribution in a ‘tra-
ditional’ probabilistic setting.15 Hence it fully suffices to
claim that (Prod. 1)→(Sep.), and that (Sep.)→(Prod. 2)
to get the central premise:
(Prod. 1)→ (Prod. 2) (P.-Indep.)
Suppose now that there is a ∆ such that λ1, λ2 ∈ ∆,
i.e. there are true states on both of the two systems which
15This of course means that pj(λ1|λ2, ψ(2)k ) = pj(λ1), j, k ∈
{0,+}, with ψ(2)k the preparation state for the second system, and
analogously for pk(λ2).
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Not +,+
0 or +
Not 0,0
Not 0,+
Not +,0
Preparation Measurement
0 or +
Figure 4: Each system is prepared in one of two quantum states;
the entangled measurement performed on both systems simul-
taneously then finds out which of the four possible product
states was not prepared.
lie in the overlap-region for probability distributions pos-
sibly associated with distinct quantum states |0〉 and |+〉.
Basically: assume ψ-epistemicity to hold, as defined in
section 3.1. Also, fix some lower limit q > 0 such that
pk(λ1) ≥ q, p`(λ2) ≥ q for k, ` ∈ {0,+} and λ1, λ2 ∈ ∆.
Then by (P.-Indep.), we get that
pΨ(λ1, λ2) ≥ q2, ∀Ψ ∈ P ∀λ1, λ2 ∈ ∆ (∆)
We call this intermediate result ‘(∆)’ because the ex-
istence of some ∆ (i.e. the positivity of the product dis-
tribution pΨ on some set of non-zero measure) regardless1190
of the specific preparation on each system, is crucial. It is
also crucial to realize that the preparation procedures on
both systems do the same thing, i.e., prepare either |+〉
or |0〉, whence the (total) range of true states λ possibly
resulting from the preparations is identical for the two sys-1195
tems. This (in concert with (P.-Indep.)) justifies why it
even makes sense to consider this setup for two systems
as a means to check for the possibility of a ψ-epistemic
model, where the assumption of an overlap was previously
formulated w.r.t. to the states of one and the same system.1200
Now the measurement executed on the two systems is
performed by bringing them together in one measurement-
device and measuring them jointly (cf. figure 4). A mea-
surement of this kind is called global, since all the systems
in some total state |Φ〉 are measured together, whence only1205
information about the totality of systems or their total
state |Φ〉 is acquired. Among such global measurements,
one can further distinguish measurements which have only
product states as possible outcomes from such which have
at least one entangled state among their outcomes. That is1210
to say, in the latter case, the operators used to describe the
measurement have entangled eigenvectors. These are then
(unsurprisingly) called entangled measurements [cf. e.g. 49,
pp. 219-220].
The measurement considered by PBR is exactly such
an entangled (global) measurement. Furthermore, it is
projective, resulting in an M-state out of the following set:
R :=
{
|φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉),
|φ2〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 |−〉+ |1〉 |+〉),
|φ3〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |1〉+ |−〉 |0〉),
|φ4〉 = 1√
2
(|+〉 |−〉+ |−〉 |+〉)
}
[cf. 29, p. 476].16 What we now see is that for each of the1215
|φj〉 ∈ R there is a |Ψk〉 ∈ P which is orthogonal to it
(whence the global property to be measured is which of
the states was not prepared; cf. figure 4). For instance,
〈φ1|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(〈0|⊗〈1|+ 〈1|⊗〈0|) |0〉⊗|0〉 =
=
1√
2
(〈0|0〉 〈1|0〉+ 〈1|0〉 〈0|0〉) =
=
1√
2
(1 · 0 + 0 · 1) = 0, (8)
and (because of the way we have indexed the states) in
general 〈φj |Ψj〉 = 0.1220
But recall that the connection between the Born prob-
abilities and the probability distributions in the OM was
established by an integral over the epistemic state and the
response function (formula (1)). This integral must now
take the form
Pr
|Ψk〉
R (j) =
∫
dλ1
∫
dλ2 pk(λ1, λ2)ξ
φj
R (λ1, λ2)
[cf. 29, p. 477], with ξ
φj
R (λ1, λ2) the response function for
outcome φj .
Moreover, it is plausible to require that
4∑
j=1
ξ
φj
R (λ1, λ2) = 1, ∀(λ1, λ2) ∈ ΛΨ, (Outc.)
i.e. that there will always be some outcome for all the
states that may result from the preparation [cf. e.g. 30,
p. 1]. Of course this is quite an idealization, and we may1225
assume that (Outc.) is only required to hold up to ex-
pected experimental noise and error.
Since p1(λ1, λ2) is at least q
2 on a set ∆ of non-zero
measure, however, i.e. in virtue of (∆), at least after error
correction it must hold that
∃k∀j : Pr|Ψj〉R (k) =
∫
dλ1
∫
dλ2 pj(λ1, λ2)ξ
φk
R (λ1, λ2) > 0
!
= |〈φk|Ψj〉|2 = 0 for j = k  (PBR)
16We call this set ‘R’ for ‘result’, and for notational simplicity we
will later also use this letter to refer to the measurement (POVM)
associated with the outcome states in R.
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(with j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}). This is the PBR contradiction.
(Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), and (Outc.) taken together with
the definition of ψ-epistemicity and the general assump-
tions of the OM framework (short: {OM}), lead to a con-
tradiction; hence PBR conclude:
{OM}, (Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), (Outc.) ` ¬(ψ-epistemicity)
(9)
This means that any ψ-epistemic OM cannot maintain
(Prod. 1), (P.-Indep.), and (Outc.) together, all of which
are prima facie reasonable assumptions. So possibly there1230
are no suitable ψ-epistemic OMs.
We have restricted our attention to the two-system
case, but the result of PBR is generalized [29, p. 476 ff.]
using tensor-product states |Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |ψn〉 of ar-
bitrary finite cardinality n, where each system is prepared1235
in either |0〉 or |+〉 (ψj ∈ {0,+}, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n). This allows
for states with an overlap different from that between |0〉
and |+〉 to be used in the preparation.
But how deep is the impact of PBR’s result really?
Should it be taken to rule out ψ-epistemic OMs tout court?1240
To answer this question, we should look at each of the
assumptions of the proof separately.
(Prod. 1), it seems, is rather uncontroversial. Of course
one could in principle conjecture that a product state is
never truly possible, especially not if two indistinguishable1245
systems are concerned, and maybe also not in the relevant
kind of setup used to test the consequences of the theo-
rem. Nevertheless, the practice of using product states for
similar situations has good experimental support, and we
will hence treat (Prod. 1) as unproblematic.1250
But a lot of criticism toward the other premises of
the PBR theorem can be found especially in an article
by Schlosshauer and Fine [50]. Notably, they first of all
refrain from even using the terminology of ‘ψ-epistemic’
and ‘ψ-onitc’ models, and refer to these classes of models1255
as ‘mixed’ and ‘segregated’ instead (to them this termi-
nology is “less charged” [50, p. 4]). Thus, the general apt-
ness of the very definition of a ψ-epistemic model used in
the OM approach may of course be put into question (and
hence the premise {OM}), and a whole other set of criteria1260
for understanding the wave function as a representation of
knowledge may of course be available (a thought that we
should keep in mind). Schlossauer and Fine then also show
a way of transforming mixed models into segregated ones
and vice versa, thus lessening the appeal of the definitions1265
from section 3.1 as indeed reflecting a distinction between
something that represents knowledge and something that
represents something real.17
Beyond that, Schlosshauer and Fine suggest to aug-
ment the spectrum of outcome values associated with the1270
measurement with so called ‘no-shows’, i.e. to allow for
measurements with no discernible outcome at all, and hence
to modify the connection between the Born probabilities
17These charges of transformability between the two types of mod-
els are, however, challenged by Leifer [8, p. 113-114].
and the probability distributions in the OM-framework ac-
cordingly. One crucial step of PBR’s theorem is to require1275
(Outc.) and (Outc.) is, as we noted, somewhat ideal-
ized. Modifying this requirement in such a way that, given
that the true state is in the overlap region, there will be
a probability of obtaining no outcome at all, determined
by the true state itself, obviously blocks the inference to1280
¬(ψ-epistemicity). Schlosshauer and Fine refer to this as
a “built-in inefficiency” [50, p. 2], since the assumption is
that there is something about the measured system itself
which lets the probability of a (discernible) outcome drop
in the appropriate region—i.e. not just regular sources of1285
experimental error.
A bit more precisely, the general recipe goes like this:
Determine some probability ξ∅R(λ1, λ2) of getting a null-
outcome ∅ (i.e. something that cannot be recognized prop-
erly as an outcome on the measuring device), sufficiently1290
high for the λ ∈ ∆, so that the QM statistics is repro-
duced, but now from probabilities conditional on the fact
that a discernible outcome was measured at all (i.e. by
‘postselecting’ the statistics for runs in which there was
a determinate outcome). Then for the set of outcomes1295
{φ1, . . . φ4, ∅}, the resulting version of (Outc.) is not vi-
olated and no contradiction arises. Under these assump-
tions, all that the PBR-result shows is “how inefficiencies
arise as a fundamental property of certain hidden-variables
models [...].” [50, p. 2]1300
This is a kind of ‘prism model’, which the reader may
be familiar with from the context of Bell inequalities. How-
ever, there is a certain ad hoc-ness to assuming that the
true states from the overlap mysteriously sabotage the
measurement procedure just to recover the quantum statis-1305
tics. Thus we may be inclined to put more doubt on the
justifyability of Schlosshauer and Fine’s no-show assess-
ment than on PBR’s own one.
The various assumptions underlying (P.-Indep.) are
also under scrutiny in Schlosshauer’s and Fine’s article.1310
They think that “[c]orrelations [...] cannot be ruled out,
even if the preparations appear to be independent, be-
cause procedures for preparing the individual subsystems
may occur together closely in spacetime or share common
sources of energy, as well as a common past.” [50, p. 3] In1315
our reconstruction, and given that we have deemed (Prod.
1) as comparatively harmless, we may take this criticism
to aim at the validity of the implication (Prod. 1)→(Sep.),
and so indirectly at the validity of (P.-Indep.). But (Sep.)
can be weakened to the condition (call it ‘(Sep.∗)’) that, if1320
there is a λ in the support of each of the epistemic states
associated with the multiple systems and respective quan-
tum states, then there is also some λc in the support of
the common distribution pΨ associated with the product
state |Ψ〉 = |ψ1〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |ψn〉 (ibid.). The exact nature1325
(and structure) of λc can then be left completely unspeci-
fied. From this one neither gets the condition (P.-Indep.),
because (Sep.∗) does not imply (Prod. 2), but rather that
pΨ(λc) > 0 (call this ‘(Pos.)’). Nor does one get the (exact)
q2-result (∆), which follows from (Prod. 2), not (Pos.).1330
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But since the weaker (Pos.) is obviously sufficient to de-
rive a contradiction (i.e. (Outc.) would still have to be vio-
lated) it appears that PBR’s conclusion ¬(ψ-epistemicity)
is not really warranted, and that the theorem need not
be considered as applying to ψ-epistemic models after all.1335
But this move of Schlosshauer and Fine is only possible
on the pains of replacing (Sep.) by (Sep.∗) and hence by
denying (P.-Indep.), or in other words: by assuming that
the systems in question cannot be prepared (sufficiently)
independently of one another.1340
Another assumption, also scrutinized by Schlosshauer
and Fine, which PBR implicitly make, and which is al-
ready present in {OM}, is that the response functions
ξ
φj
R (λ1, λ2) do not depend on Ψ. Here Schlosshauer and
Fine [50, p. 2 ff.] propose that models which avoid the1345
problem raised by PBR can be constructed, in case the ξs
are allowed to depend on Ψ. They call the class of models
presupposed by PBR state-independent. Leifer [8, p. 111],
in contrast, thinks that “this criticism is simply a misun-
derstanding of what is meant by the term ‘ontic state’ in1350
the ontological models framework”, and goes on to demon-
strate an example of how models can trivially reproduce
the Born probabilities in case state dependence is allowed
(that is, in case ξ is also conditional on the prepared quan-
tum state Ψ). In a similar vein, Ballentine refers to such1355
models as “functionally ψ-ontic”, because
[t]he most important structure of the model
is the separation of preparation from measure-
ment, with information passing only via the
ontic state variables. If the state ψ has a di-1360
rect effect on the measurement outcome, then
ψ should be classified as an ontic variable. [51,
p. 6; emphasis in original]
Hence the assumption of state independence may be
considered as justified (or -fiable); the introduction of state1365
dependence conceptually undermines the very idea behind
ψ-epistemicity in the OM-approach.
Nevertheless, Schlosshauer and Fine’s conclusions on
the impact of the PBR theorem remain de-emphasizing:
PBR show that state-independent models of1370
composites formed using systems with mixed
[ψ-epistemic – FB] models face restrictions. It
is vital to see that those restrictions do not im-
ply any difficulty for models of the components
themselves. The PBR theorem is not a no-go1375
theorem for the component systems[...]. [50,
p. 4 ff.; my emphasis – FB]
And indeed, the theorem is not concerned with several
quantum states of a single system, but only has an impact
on overlapping epistemic states via the detour of using1380
product states of compound systems. One may jump in
at any point and criticize the assumptions that bridge the
gap, as we have just seen. Moreover, Lewis et al. [27]
actually have provided two variants of a ψ-epistemic model
which become possible in case (P.-Indep.) is dropped.181385
But the models are utterly formal, and they also concede:
None of these models is intuitive or motivated
by physical principles or considerations. The
primary motivation for exploring the possibil-
ity of ψ-epistemic models is to understand the1390
formal limitations of reproducing quantum the-
ory from a deeper theory. [27, p. 4]
Their conclusion w.r.t. the latter aim is that “any
similar no-go theorem will also require nontrivial assump-
tions beyond those required for a well-formed ontological1395
model.” [27, p. 1] We can take from this that, while re-
stricting the possibility of ψ-epistemic models, the PBR
theorem (and similar results) should not count as a full
no-go theorem for these models, in the sense of demon-
strating their impossibility. They all rely on additional1400
assumptions and can hence maximally limit the attrac-
tiveness of ψ-epistemic hidden variable models, or more
precisely, show their incompatibility with these very as-
sumptions.
Regarding the existence of other such theorems, the1405
PBR paper has indeed caused a whole landslide of publi-
cations which put forward theorems purportedly showing
the impossibility of ψ-epistemic models (so, in fact, their
incompatibility with other plausible assumptions).19 One
such theorem that we should now take a closer look at is1410
that of Hardy [42]. This will give us a chance to directly
confront the purported achievements of ψ-epistemic mod-
els, more specifically: of Spekkens’ toy model.
4.2. Hardy’s Theorem
The gist of Hardy’s theorem can best be captured by1415
appeal to an interferometry example like the ones we had
met with in section 3.3.
θ = pi
d1
d2
S
(a) θ = pi
d1
d2
S
(b)
Figure 5: (a) is the Mach-Zehnder setup as discussed in sec-
tion 3.3. In (b) the photon is emitted somewhere along the
upper trajectory, whence the phase shifter in the lower trajec-
tory should have no effect.
18They do not use our formal reconstruction of preparation in-
dependence in their article though, but instead give the informal
characterization that “situations where quantum theory assigns in-
dependent product states are presumed to be completely describable
by independently combining the two purportedly deeper descriptions
for each system.” [27, p. 1]
19A partial survey of the developments up to the year 2014 can be
found in [8].
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In Hardy’s own words, the argument based on the fol-
lowing example amounts to a “version of the popular argu-
ment for something going both ways[...].” [42, p. 6] Con-
sider, in contrast to the Mach-Zehnder example we have
discussed in section 3.3, an altered setup where the source
of photons is placed somewhere along the upper route (cf.
figure 5 (b)). In this altered setup, it should not mat-
ter whether the beam splitter is inserted or not; whereas
in the original Mach-Zehnder example we would obtain
either − |↘〉 or |↗〉 at the end of the interferometer, de-
pending on whether the phase shifter was in or not, we
will here simply have
UˆH σˆx |↗〉 = UˆH |↘〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉 − |↘〉), (10)
whence detection at d1 and d2 will be equiprobable.
Now consider the state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↗〉 + |↘〉) as pre-
pared by the first beam splitter in the setup of figure 5 (a),1420
and the state |φ〉 = |↗〉 as prepared by the source in the
setup of figure 5 (b). These two states are non-orthogonal
and hence could well be taken to have overlapping sup-
ports in a ψ-epistemic model. In this context, we can un-
derstand this claim such that it is not impossible for the1425
first beam splitter to prepare a photon which is actually
traveling up, and that |ψ〉 is again just indicative of our
lack of knowledge about the true state, i.e. the true path
that the photon takes.
But then it should make no difference for the photons
actually traveling up whether the phase shifter is inserted
in the lower path or not. Thus, denote the full set of true
states associated with |φ〉 by Λ|φ〉, and the subset of those
resulting in a click in detector d1 or detector d2 by Λ
d1
|φ〉 and
Λd2|φ〉 respectively. One can also associate a given setting
of the phase shifter (in or out) to these sets, which we
indicate by the notation Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ] (j ∈ {1, 2}, θ ∈ {0, pi}).
But since the choice of θ as 0 or pi should not alter the
behavior of the photon going along the upper path, we
obtain a kind of invariance:
Λ
dj
|φ〉 = Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ = 0] = Λ
dj
|φ〉[θ = pi], j ∈ {1, 2}. (INVAR)
Assume that the photon is bound to end up in one of
the detectors—neglecting, of course, experimental errors,
i.e., photons getting absorbed somewhere along the way
or detectors not firing upon incidence—whence it should
hold that
Λ|φ〉 = Λ
d1
|φ〉 ∪ Λd2|φ〉, (TOT)
irrespective of the choice of θ. Now consider the set of true1430
states Λ|ψ〉 associated with |ψ〉 (the state prepared by the
first beam splitter). We had established above that in case
the phase shifter is in (θ = pi), the state |ψ〉 will not result
in any clicks in detector d1. Thus it should hold that
Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd1|φ〉[θ = pi] = ∅
⇔ Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd1|φ〉 = ∅, (11)
where the equivalence follows from (INVAR). Analogously,1435
in case the phase shifter is out (θ = 0), there will be no
clicks in detector d2 if |ψ〉 is prepared, so that
Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd2|φ〉[θ = 0] = ∅
⇔ Λ|ψ〉 ∩ Λd2|φ〉 = ∅. (12)
But from (TOT), (11), and (12) it now follows that Λ|ψ〉∩
Λ|φ〉 = ∅, whence there is no intersection in the sets of
true states associated with the two non-orthogonal states1440
|ψ〉 and |φ〉. This in turn means that the epistemic states
for the two preparation methods associated with |ψ〉 and
|φ〉 cannot have overlapping supports. Thus, it seems, this
situation cannot be understood ψ-epistemically.
Of course this is not yet a no-go theorem for ψ-epistemic1445
OMs but merely an example. In the remainder of his pa-
per, Hardy provides a generalization, first for finite Hilbert
spaces, for which it is shown that non-orthogonal states
with a certain lower bound quantum probability | 〈φ|ψ〉 |2
(which depends on the dimension of the Hilbert space)1450
will result in distributions with non-overlapping supports
(pp. 9-13). For an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, the
result is then shown to hold regardless of the quantum
probability (p. 12). For a rigorous, general proof one of
course needs to abstract from beam splitters, mirrors, and1455
phase shifters. The phase shifter, for instance, is replaced
by a general unitary transformation with some general pa-
rameter m (instead of the phase shift θ) to be varied [42,
p. 10 ff.].
But of course, a few crucial assumptions also have to1460
be made to run this proof, just as in the PBR case. For
the proof of Hardy’s theorem the following two principles
have to be assumed [cf. 42, pp. 4-5]:
Possibilistic Completeness (PC). The ontic state, λ, is
sufficient to determine whether any outcome of any mea-1465
surement has probability equal to zero of occurring or not.
Restcricted Ontic Indifference (ROD). Any quantum
transformation on a system which leaves a particular given
pure quantum state, |0〉, unchanged can be implemented
in such a way that it does not affect the underlying ontic1470
states, λ ∈ Λ|0〉, in the ontic support of |0〉.
Note that Hardy first assumes a stronger principle of
ontic indifference, which is supposed to hold for any arbi-
trary quantum state |ψ〉 instead of a particular one (|0〉).
He then demonstrates that the weaker principle (ROD) is1475
sufficient to run the proof [42, p. 12]. The ‘ontic support’
is of course the support of the epistemic state, i.e., the
set of true states λ which may result from the preparation
procedure associated with |ψ〉. (PC) is also a rather weak
principle, since the true state only determines whether an1480
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outcome has probability zero or not, instead of determin-
ing the exact probability.20
We have seen both of these principles at work in the
example considered above. (PC) is used to define the sets
of states which may give rise to a detection by d1 or d21485
respectively. (ROD) is invoked in assuming that (INVAR)
holds, i.e. that it does not make a difference to the photon
traveling in the upper path whether the phase shifter is
inserted or not. The assumption is akin to a kind of lo-
cality constraint, as Hardy himself equally notes [42, p. 3],1490
which informally means that whether something is done
over here should not immediately influence what happens
somewhere else. But of course we know that such an as-
sumption becomes iffy in the context of QM, and hence it
is doubtworthy whether any hidden variable model which1495
purports to reproduce QM’s predictions should respect it.
The critical reader will object that we have seen Spekkens’
toy model reproduce interferometer examples like the one
considered in this section. Is the toy model non-local?
Prima facie the answer here is ‘no’, but only on the price1500
of accommodating a non-trivial ‘vacuum state’, akin to
that of quantum field theory (QFT) into the ontology pre-
supposed by the model. Thus Hardy writes:21
[T]here are ontic variables associated with the
occupation number of the path (take this to be1505
0 or 1) and a phase associated with the path
(take this to be 0 or pi). Even if the occupa-
tion number is 0 there is still the phase variable
which will be affected by a phase shifter. Thus
a path with no particle in it still has nontrivial1510
degrees of freedom associated with it. This al-
lows the model to violate ontic indifference in
a local way. [42, pp. 14-18]
And Leifer similarly thinks that it is possible to save
the interference examples from the consequences of Hardy’s1515
theorem in this fashion:
From quantum field theory, we know that the
vacuum is not a featureless void, but has some
sort of structure. Therefore, it makes sense
that, at the ontological level, there might be1520
more than one ontic state associated with the
vacuum, and a transformation that does not
affect things localized [in one arm of an inter-
ferometer – FB] might still act nontrivially on
these vacuum ontic states. [...] A transfor-1525
mation acting locally on [one arm – FB] can
20The intuition behind the use of ‘possibility’ in the name of (PC)
is certainly that the true state determines whether an outcome is
possible at all. But this is obviously not correct, as probability zero
is not synonymous with something being impossible on all accounts
of probability. The limit frequency of an event in an infinite random
sequence may be zero even though this event is not impossible.
21Here he is referring especially to elaborations from a talk given
by Spekkens [44].
then switch the ontic states, in violation of on-
tic indifference, whilst leaving the distribution
invariant. [8, p. 121; my emphasis – FB]
So not: ‘something goes both ways’, but rather: ‘for1530
each way there is something which goes it’. But this analy-
sis still has a foul taste to it and may strike us as somewhat
in conflict with Spekkens’ model. The reason is that here,
for the first time, an appeal to the very nature of the true
states is made, whereas the treatment so far has been en-1535
tirely neutral on the subject. And the true states which are
invoked as explanatory are ‘borrowed’ from QM, whereas
so far QM was treated as precisely not conveying a suitable
ontology of the microcosm. Recall that Spekkens claims
that: “The key is that one can hope to identify phenomena1540
that are characteristic of states of incomplete knowledge
regardless of what this knowledge is about.” [34, p. 2] The
interferometer example does obviously not constitute an
example of incomplete knowledge, regardless of what this
knowledge is about. For this example to make sense, one1545
either has to commit to a direct influence between the two
arms of the interferometer (which would violate the other-
wise ‘local’ spirit of the model), or one has to construct a
specific kind of true state reminiscent of the vaccuum state
from QFT, in order for the model to make sense. Below,1550
we will assess the legitimacy of this move in more detail.
5. Discussion: Prospects of the Einsteinian View
What can we say about the achievements of the Ein-
steinian view, as presented in the form of the OM ap-
proach? To recall, the appeal of the Einsteinian view is1555
that it is very natural and spares us a great deal of meta-
physical complication. The appeal of the OM approach, in
particular, is that it provides a concrete formal framework
to accommodate the Einsteinian intuitions, and appears
to implement them in such a way that (certain of) QM’s1560
predictions are preserved.
Timpson, however, has objected that opting for hidden-
variables in general
is unlikely to be attractive to anyone who is
trying to appeal to information as a way of1565
avoiding the problems caused by the seemingly
odd behaviour of the quantum state. The aim,
roughly speaking, was to circumvent the prob-
lems associated with collapse or nonlocality by
arguments of the form: there’s not really any1570
physical collapse, just a change in our knowl-
edge; there’s not really any nonlocality, it’s
only Alice’s knowledge of (information about)
Bob’s system that changes when she performs
a measurement on her half of an EPR pair. But1575
we all know that if we are to have hidden vari-
ables lurking around then these are going to
be very badly behaved indeed in quantum me-
chanics (nonlocality, contextuality). [52, pp. 146-
147; emphasis omitted]1580
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Of course the appeal here is to such theorems as that
of Bell [25] or of Kochen and Specker [53], and in the
light of these one may ask: why even bother with hidden
variables in the context of epistemic interpretations in the
first place? In addition to these well known results we1585
have here considered more specific no-gos aimed directly
at the OM approach. But we have argued that the impact
of the influential PBR theorem is not that deep, and we
have outlined some achievements of the OM approach (and
more general spin offs) in reproducing certain quantum1590
phenomena and predictions from the mere assumption of
epistemic restrictions. So what about these achievements?
As for interference, we have seen that the ψ-epistemicist
has to introduce specific elements into the model, namely
what Leifer calls ‘vacuum ontic states’, in order to pro-1595
duce an empirically adequate model without admitting
non-locality. However, appealing to these vacuum ontic
states may be one of the worst possible moves at the ψ-
epistemicist’s disposal for the following reasons.
First we must ask what a vacuum ontic state actually1600
is. Of course this concept is supposed to incorporate the
quantum field theoretic vacuum in the OM approach, but
the vacuum in QFT is a theoretical concept, i.e., what a
‘vaccum state’ is “cannot be fully specified by a single
definition, but only by the joint effect of the core axioms1605
of a theory.” [54, p. 2; emphasis in original]
To make a case, consider the discussion of theoretical
concepts by Schurz and Gebharter, who use the concept
of force in Newtonian physics as a paradigmatic example,
which is defined, according to them, only by the joint ax-1610
ioms of Newtonian mechanics. A vacuum state is equally
only defined by its role as the state of lowest eigenvalue
for a given energy operator of some particular quantized
field theory, and hence by the joint assumptions of the
theory instead of one single theory-independent definition;1615
and compare this also to individual forces being defined in
terms of particular differential equations and initial con-
ditions for given physical problems. This dependence on
a given field theory goes so far as to lead to two phys-
ically inequivalent vacui in the case of the Unruh effect1620
[cf. e.g. 55], for two observers who are non-inertially re-
lated to one another; and this may be compared to ‘ficti-
cious forces’ in Newtonian mechanics, which equally result
from coordinate transformations between relatively non-
inertial frames. It appears that no general, all-applying1625
definition of the term ‘vacuum state’ as used in QFT can
be given, so that the situation is indeed comparable to
that of Newtonian force. This should give some credibility
for considering ‘vacuum state’ as a theoretical concept of
QFT in the aforementioned sense.1630
Thus what a vacuum ontic state is is far from clear. It
must be a new concept, peculiar to the OM approach, or
a suitable theory formulated therein, or a suitable replace-
ment thereof.
What is even worse though, is that in algebraic QFT1635
(AQFT), there is the Reeh-Schlieder theorem [56], which
says that for an open bounded region O ⊂ R4 of space-
time and Aˆ(O) an element of the algebra generated from
all possible combinations of adjoints, sums, and products
of operators φˆ(f) :=
∫
d4x f(x)φˆ(x), f ∈ C∞0 (O), the set1640
of vectors Aˆ(O) |Ω〉 is dense in the space H of state vectors
(|Ω〉 the vacuum state). This means that one can approx-
imate (arbitrarily close) any state |ψ〉 by operations local
to O, even if |ψ〉 has implications for regions O′ at a space-
like distance to O [cf. 57, p. S497 ff.]. Most importantly,1645
the theorem thus “demonstrates”, as Dieks puts it, “that
the vacuum, and all other states of bounded energy, have
long-distance correlations built into them. It is therefore
not surprising to find that Bell inequalities are violated in
these states—a standard sign of non-locality.” [58, p. 216]1650
Here Dieks of course refers to the work of Werner and
Summers, who found, in the 1980s, “that already the vac-
uum fluctuations assure a maximal violation of Bell’s in-
equalities for the appropriate detectors.” [59, pp. 258-259]
Thus, any notion of ‘vacuum ontic states’ that is suffi-1655
ciently close to the QFT-notion of a vacuum state defects
the interferometer examples—because the element of QFT
appealed to in order to restore locality is itself a decisive
expression of quantum non-locality.
One might object that these implications follow only1660
from the highly theoretical algebraic version of QFT, and
that in practice, the canonical quantization approach is
all that is needed. This worry gains support by Wal-
lace’s observation that “no examples are known of AQFT-
compatible interacting field theories, and in particular the1665
standard model cannot at present be made AQFT-compa-
tible.” [60, p. 33] Thus it may be suspected that these
consequences of the Reeh-Schlieder theorem have no bear-
ing on experimental practice and hence do not have to be
taken seriously, in virtue of a lack of empirical accessibility.1670
But similar worries were originally raised w.r.t. the strong
non-local correlations predicted by ordinary QM (most no-
tably by Schro¨dinger [23, p. 166]), and if there is anything
we can learn from this example, it is that one is better off
not to dismiss the implications of the quantum formalism1675
easily.
However, the situation is a bit more subtle in the case
of testing vacuum entanglement, since, as Werner and
Summers put it, “there would be experimental difficulties
[...][because] the violation of Bell’s inequality must vanish1680
exponentially with the spatial separation of [two separate
spacetime regions] on the length scale determined by the
Compton wavelength of the lightest particle of the theory.”
[59, p. 259]
There are suggestions for other kinds of experiments in1685
which vacuum states crucially enter into entangled states
though, namely states entangled with those of a single
photon. Examples of such experimental protocols are dis-
cussed, for instance, in [61] or [62]. Typically these schemes
are used to show that even a single particle is ‘nonlocal’1690
in a sense, as noticed already by Einstein in his examples
discussed at the 1927 Solvay conference [cf. 63, pp. 115-
116].
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Despite some original controversy [cf. 64, p. 2 ff. for
discussion] today there is a broad consensus that particular1695
experiments can be used to test exactly for this ‘single
particle nonlocality’ which involves entanglement with the
vacuum, and the experiments that have been performed
are reported to provide affirmations of the predictions [65],
[66].1700
Provisios about the interpretation of the cited experi-
ments aside, we hence have good theoretical and empirical
reasons to suspect that quantum vacuum states are just
the kind of states which involve the problematic nonlo-
cal correlations. In the light of these features of the QFT1705
vacuum, we are lead to judge that the ψ-epistemicist is
faced with the following dilemma: if he appeals to vac-
uum states in close analogy to the vacuum state of QFT,
then he has not provided a local explanation of interfer-
ence phenomena after all and has not followed his program1710
of construing QM states as indicative of preparations and
measurements only. If, on the other hand, he postulates
a new kind of nontrivial vacuum, inspired by certain ex-
perimental results, he has merely shifted the burden from
explaining interference to explaining these new kinds of1715
states, together with all the empirical data that we have
about QFT’s vacuum states.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the bullet
is being bitten by taking the second horn of the dilemma
and accepting a new kind of vacuum state, peculiar to1720
the OM approach. Then we are lead to wonder: if such
remarkable and remarkably counterintuitive results which
can be derived from quantum theory are simply presup-
posed instead of explained and use-novelly predicted by a
ψ-epistemic model, what good is the model then?1725
Bartlett et al. in fact delineate their aim in seeking out
epistemic models follows: “it is only by describing a broad
landscape of possible theories that we can specify the sense
in which quantum theory is special.” [19, p. 3] This may
be an honorable task, but if this is the only purpose of1730
ψ-epistemic (and asorted) models, then they will not at
all help us resolve the conceptual difficulties arising from
QM and the MP.
Einstein viewed the QM of his time as “no useful point
of departure for future development” [67, p. 87], and since1735
the point of departure for the ψ-epistemic interpretations
under consideration are Einsteinian worries, it must be
seen as a ‘partial surrender’ to QM if the only purpose
of certain models is to show how QM is special. From an
Einsteinian point of view, the aim must rather be to search1740
for serious alternatives because QM is ‘too special’.
What about Spekkens’ analysis of certain entangled
states, which seemed to indicate that entanglement and
correlations in remote measurement outcomes are also just
instances of a previous lack of knowledge about the true1745
states of the systems involved? In fact, Bartlett et al.
in a similar vein model “maximal bipartite entanglement
in [restricted Liouville] mechanics [...] by an epistemic
state that describes perfect correlations between the pair
of systems.” [19, p. 8] In particular, they use a probability1750
distribution µcorrAB (qA, pA, qB , pB) ∝ δ(qA − qB)δ(pA + pB)
as phase space distribution for two systems A and B for
which it is known that qA − qB = 0 and pA + pB = 0, i.e.
which satisfy the conditions of the original EPR thought
experiment [cf. 68]. Marginalizing for the coordinates of1755
one of the two systems leads to a uniform distribution, so
that nothing is known about the true states of the single
systems, but only relational properties of the joint system
are known (the total values for position and momentum
named above).1760
But this relational knowledge implies that in virtue of
her prior knowledge of the value of the total momentum
of the two systems, Alice, say, can determine the momen-
tum value for Bob’s system at once, after measuring mo-
mentum on her system, and analogously for position. In1765
essence, we here get the same kind of informational update
in consequence of a measurement on the total system, and
thus just as the epistemic state in Spekkens’ qubit-like toy
model mirrored the properties of measurements on an en-
tangled qubit state, the distribution in the restricted ver-1770
sion of Liouville mechanics mirrors the properties of mea-
surements on the original EPR-state.22 And upon learning
the value of Bob’s position measurement (say), Alice can
infer, on the basis of her own momentum measurement, the
complete phase space coordinates (qA, pA) at once, which1775
makes EPR’s original point.
In summary, as Bartlett et al. put it:
All that changes as a result of this measure-
ment is how the observer refines her knowledge
of the ontic state of particle B. She either re-1780
fines her knowledge of its position or she refines
her knowledge of its momentum. No ‘spooky
action at a distance’ is required to understand
the EPR experiment if one adopts the inter-
pretation offered by [restricted Liouville] me-1785
chanics. [19, p. 12]
Both examples, that of Spekkens and that of Bartlett
et al., are indeed suggestive. But they are suggestive of
something false. It is not that quantum non-locality can
be explained in terms of knowledge in general. It is only1790
by selectively choosing particular states which can be mir-
rored by ordinary probability distributions that one can
create the illusion that this is possible. This is exactly the
gist of Bell’s theorem—that quantum (anti-)correlations
22There are, however, a few well known difficulties with the ac-
tual preparation and measurement of EPR states in the sense of the
original paper: the state is not time dependent, and the descriptions
used to set up the argument for incompleteness would only be valid
at t = 0, whereas time evolution makes it unstable; and since a plane
wave representation is used, there would be non-vanishing probabil-
ity of the two particles being basically anywhere in space, so that
the assumption of spatial separatedness is actually unwarranted [cf.
69, p. 13]. However, Praxmeyer et al. have constructed a scheme in
which the EPR state appears as the limit of a two-mode squeezed
state, and observables on it are considered which can be used to
violate a Bell-type inequality [70].
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are not like those between Bertlmann’s socks [7]. For—1795
admittedly—none of the models can reproduce violations
of Bell-type inequalities or the like:
The toy theory is, by construction, a local and
noncontextual hidden variable theory. Thus, it
cannot possibly capture all of quantum theory.1800
In the face of these no-go theorems, a propo-
nent of the epistemic view is forced to accept
alternative possibilities for the nature of the
ontic states to which our knowledge pertains
in quantum theory. [34, pp. 24-25]1805
We emphasize that we are not arguing that a
ψ-epistemic local hidden variable model could
explain all quantum correlations, only that the
particular correlations described in the EPR
experiment can be so explained (in precisely1810
the way that EPR suggested they should). This
is not at odds with Bell’s theorem because the
correlations in the EPR experiment do not vio-
late a Bell inequality.23 Of course, because it is
locally causal by construction, [restricted Liou-1815
ville] mechanics cannot hope to reproduce Bell-
inequality violations. Such violations are one
of the quantum phenomena that [restricted Li-
ouville] mechanics emphatically cannot repro-
duce, not even qualitatively. [19, pp. 24-25]1820
6. Conclusions
What we see is that any meaningful OM is bound to
look like QM itself in important respects, and that the
apparent successes of the OM approach ultimately rest ei-
ther on a selective choice of examples, or involves strongly1825
ad hoc and possibly illegitimate moves, in particular to
such curiosities as ‘vacuum ontic states’. All the creativ-
ity and formal elegance used in the general approach and
the particular models discussed above apparently cannot
bring us past this point. It is thus understandable why1830
more recently even Spekkens has conceded that
the investigation of [epistemically restricted]
theories is best considered as a first step in
a larger research program wherein the frame-
work of ontological models [...] is ultimately1835
rejected, but where one holds fast to the no-
tion that a quantum state is epistemic. [71,
p. 7]
Moreover, we once more emphasize that conceptually
meaningful models which also fully reproduce QM are miss-1840
ing entirely to date; Spekkens’ toy model and its successor
23Depending on the specific setup used to implement the states
appealed to in the EPR paper, this becomes a debatable claim; cf.
footnote 22.
for continuous degrees of freedom being maybe the closest
calls. But even these two models do not at all explain what
the true states λ are, or how they bring about the puzzling
quantum statistics and correlations; they merely stipulate1845
their existence. And the formally successful models such
as that of Lewis et al. [27] appear, in philosophers’ terms,
gerrymandered.
Apparently, the MP cannot be solved (or avoided) in
the way we have called ‘natural’, i.e. by depriving quantum1850
states of their ‘onticity’ and seeking for a deeper descrip-
tion in terms of hidden variables more in accord classical
intuitions. This point remains throughout the decades and
is due to a conflict with confirmed empirical predictions of
QM. If the problems associated with QM are a matter1855
of knowledge in some sense, then this knowledge still is
knowledge about something rather peculiar. Thus if one
is to have an epistemic interpretation of QM, one may
be better off looking to the other camp, the Bohrian one.
The most famous recent version of an interpretation of this1860
type is Qbism (cf. e.g. [72]; [73]), which avoids the λs and
presupposes a subjective Bayesian framework instead [cf.
74]. Maybe here is where one might hope to find a suitable
epistemic interpretation of QM after all.
As a final remark we note that despite the insistence1865
of actual Qbists on their being realists, in such Bohrian
approaches the assumptions of (selective) scientific and
metaphysical realism become iffy, because if we cannot
even entertain dummy descriptions λ to refer to the true
configurations of that which is investigated in experiments,1870
it indeed becomes at the very least unspeakable [75]. Put
frankly, if the quantum state is not the true state of the
system, and there is also no additional true state λ, then
maybe there is no true state of the system. This is not only
in defiance of the semantic condition of scientific realism,1875
but it also raises doubts about the very existence (in a
mind-, language-, and theory-independent sense) of fun-
damental physical entities, and thus about metaphysical
realism.
As regards the main subject of this paper, we may1880
sum up the worries at this point with a mutilated version
of one of Einstein’s own comments on Schro¨dinger’s wave
mechanics:
The successes of [Harrigan and Spekkens’] the-
ory make a great impression, and yet [we] do1885
not know whether it is question [sic] of any-
thing more than the old quantum rules [...].
Has one really come closer to a solution of the
riddle? (after Einstein 1926; as cited in [76,
pp. 83-84])1890
Bohr, it seems, has won another round.
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